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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Bills and Notes-Intentional Cancellation of Instrument as Discharge
of Obligation
H bought sixteen bonds of a series issued by defendants in 1912.
In 1939, after the bonds had long been in default as to both principal
and interest, H was advised by her financial agent, the plaintiff here,
that they were worthless and she then burned them. When, ten years
later, defendants were undergoing bankruptcy proceedings for reorganization, the plaintiff realized that the bonds were not without
value and tried to recover as H's conservator. Held: There could be
no recovery because the destruction of the instruments was intentional,
and therefore the obligation was discharged.'
In reaching this decision the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit gives the strictest possible interpretation to the
language of the controlling Oklahoma statute which reads: "A negotiable instrument is discharged . . . (3) By the intentional cancellation
thereof by the holder;"' 2 which wording is identical with that of the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law.3
The question squarely presented here is: In order to effect a discharge of the obligation itself, does the "intentional cancellation" referred to by the statute, require that only the act of destroying the
instrument be intentional, or must there also be a further intent to
renounce all rights under the debt?
The cases which have dealt with this problem, both before and since
the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law was enacted, apparently leave
the matter still unsettled.
Only one case is found expressly construing the wording of the
statute, which decision was relied on in the principal case.4 There the
payee of the note "made away with it," and although there was some
1 State Street Trust Co. v. Muskogie Electric Trust Co., 204 F. 2d 920 (10th

Cir. 1953). If by being in default the court means the bonds had matured, it

would appear this action brought over ten years later would be barred by Oklahoma's five year statute of limitations.

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95(1)

(1937). It would make no difference that the bonds might be under seal for
Oklahoma has abolished all distinctions between sealed and unsealed instruments.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 139 (1937).
2 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 95(3)
(1937).
8
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW § 119(3), found at N. C. GEN. STAT. § 25126 (1953). THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-605 changes the language

slightly: "(1) The holder of an instrument may even without consideration discharge any party (a) by intentionally cancelling the instrument or the party's
signature by destruction or mutilation."
"McDonald v. Loomis et al., 233 Mich. 174, 206 N.W. 348 (1925).
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showing of intent to forgive the debt by the destruction of the note,
the court ruled that under the statute there is no need for a showing
of intent beyond that simply to destroy the instrument. The court
reasoned this to be the best rule, for if a holder who intentionally
destroyed the primary evidence of his debt were allowed to still maintain an action, endless frauds would be invited for the courts to test.5
In the other decisions wherein it has been found that an intentional
cancellation of the 'instrument is effective as a discharge of the debt,
there was also present the further intent to actually forgive the obliga6
tion itself.
There is, however, a group of cases in which no intent could be
shown beyond that to destroy the instrument, and no cancellation of
the obligation was found. Thus, it was held that where the parties
to the note agreed to cancel it, but also expressly agreed that the debt
was to remain in existence, the destruction of the note did not work
a cancellation of the debt for the reason that the parties did not intend
it to so operate.7 The same result was reached where it was held
to be a question for the jury to determine whether a note was torn
with intent to relinquish the right to collect the money, even though
it was intentionally destroyed during a fit of anger following a quarrel.8 Again, it was held to be no discharge of the debt when the payeewife intentionally tore her note after a quarrel with the maker-husband. 9
The rule announced by these cases would seem to be that though the
Id. at 184, 206 N.W. at 351, relying on Vanauken v. Hornbeck, 14 N. J. Law

178 (Sup. Ct. 1833), wherein plaintiff, in anger, burned a note. It was held
that there can be no action on the note for it ". . would open a door to frauds
without number-there may be memorandums, indorsements, attesting witnesses,
or matters apparent on the face of the instrument, very important to the rights
of the other party; and to get rid of which, may be the motive for carelessness
or destruction." 14 N. J. Law 178, 182 (Sup. Ct. 1833).
6 Darland v. Taylor, 52 Iowa 503, 3 N.W. 510 (1879) (destruction of note to
forgive maker of obligation itself) ; Norton v. Smith, 130 Me. 58, 153 AtI. 886
(1931) (same); Wilkins v. Skoglund, 127 Neb. 589, 256 N.W. 31 (1934)
(father gave a car to son A, and wanting to make a similar gift to son B, destroyed a note payable to him by B); Henson v. Henson, 151 Tenn. 137, 268
S.W. 378 (1925) (destruction of note to forgive obligation),, accord, Jones'
Adm'rs v. Coleman, 121 Va. 86, 92 S.E. 910 (1917) (no explanation offered for
destruction of the note, but it was presumed that the burning was intentional
and done to cancel the instrument).
'Gardner v. Rutherford, 57 Cal. App. 2d 874, 136 P. 2d 48 (1943).
8
Greene v. Doz, 182 N. Y. Supp. 900 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
' Schlemmer v. Schendorf, 20 Ind. App. 447, 49 N.E. 968 (1898). The court
here relied on Riggs v. Tayloe, 9 Wheat. 483 (U. S. 1824), where it was held
there would be an action if the destruction, "even though voluntary" (intentional?), occurs through some mistake, and on Bagley v. McMickle, 9 Cal. 430
(1858), where it was held that if the plaintiff's claim be free from all suspicion
of fraud, then the motive for the destruction becomes controlling as to whether
or not secondary evidence will be admitted to prove the existence of the debt.
Accord, Cockell v. Cawthon, 110 S.W. 2d 636 (Texas 1937), where although
dealing with renunciation, the court ruled that even though the payee delivered
a release as well as the notes themselves to the maker, if the payee did not intend
to thereby effect a renunciation, the court would find none.
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destruction of the instrument be an intentional act, if there be no intent
thereby to discharge the obligation itself, and if clearly no circumstances
are present which raise a suspicion of fraud, then the plaintiff ought
to be allowed his action.10 It should be noted that in these cases which
have held the destruction of the instrument to be no discharge of the
obligation, the action apparently was on the instrument, nothing being
said as to whether or not any action remained on the original debt."1
It would seem that this distinction could validly be made, for when
dealing with a material alteration of an instrument the courts look to
see if the alteration was fraudulently made, and if it was not, then
though the instrument is cancelled, there still exists an action on the
original debt.12 Were 'this principle extended to cases involving destruction, it would seem that so long as there are no circumstances
suggesting fraud, and there is no intent to cancel the obligation, the
court could find that the instrument is cancelled, but still allow the
holder to sue on the obligation itself.
A somewhat analogous situation to destruction of an instrument
is presented when the holder of a note or check marks it "Paid,"
thereby ostensibly discharging the instrument, 3 and later discovers
it to be actually unpaid. Thus, where a partial payment only was
made and the holder marked the note "Paid," the court found the
holder still had an action. 14 In this area the courts are apparently
willing to find that the obligation is not discharged on the ground that
the holder usually is acting under some mistake.' 5 The Uniform
"0Blade v. Noland, 12 Wend. 173 (N. Y. 1834).

Here no explanation was

given for the destruction of the note. However, strong language is used by the
court indicating that had there been evidence refuting any suspicion of fraud, an
action could have been maintained, but in the absence of such evidence the court
would not presume an honest purpose.
"1However, in Greene v. Doz, supra note 8, the court, referring to an intent
"to give up the right to collect the moneys represented by the notes," possibly
implied that had there been present no intent to discharge the obligation, there
w.ould be an action on the original debt. This distinction, of course does not
concern us when the court, as in the principal case, says the destruction of the
instrument is also a discharge of the debt.
"Born v. Lafayette Auto Co., 196 Ind. 399, 145 N.E. 833 (1924); Perry v.
Mfg. Nat. Bank of Lynn, 305 Mass. 368, 25 N.E. 2d 730 (1940); Catching v.
Ruby, 91 Ore. 506, 178 Pac. 796 (1919).
"Washington Loan & Trust Co. v. Colby et al., 108 F. 2d 743 (D. C. Cir.
1939), relying on District of Columbia v. Cornell, 130 U. S. 655, 658 (1888).
wherein it was said: "It is immaterial whether the cancellation is by destroying
the instrument, or by writing or stamping words or lines in ink upon its face,
provided the instrument . . . unequivocally shows that it has been cancelled."
" First Nat. Bank of Vicksburg v. Drexler, 184 So. 607 (La. 1938).
" Banks v. Marshall, 23 Cal. 223 (1863) (Where plaintiff received less interest than the note called for, but surrendered the note to the maker thinking
it was fully paid, it was held that an action still existed on the note.); Drake
Lumber Co. v. Semple, 100 Fla. 1757, 130 So. 577 (1930) (Bank thought the maker
was paying his note and marked it paid. Actually the maker was buying the
note as an assignee's agent. No discharge was found as none of the parties
intended such.) ; Manufacturer's National Bank v. Thompson, 129 Mass. 438
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Negotiable Instruments Law expressly provides that the cancellation
is inoperative when made by mistake,' 0 but the analogy remains in
that just as in the principal case the holder intended to destroy the
bonds, so in the case of the note or check the holder intended to mark
the particular instrument "Paid."
The plaintiff here attempted to show that the bonds were destroyed
through mistke, but the court found only an error in judgment not
protected by the statute. 7 The mistake in the check and note cases,
where relief was granted, consisted of the holder erroneously thinking
the maker had money, while in the principal case, the holder thought
the defendants would have zo money. When the holder destroyed the
bonds the defendants did not have the money to pay, but in time they
acquired some funds. Obviously the plaintiff was mistaken as to the
skill of the defendants' financial manager and as to the economic conditions surrounding the defendants' return to solvency. It is only
questioned whether, under such circumstances, to conclude that a maker
will have no funds in the future, is any less a mistake than to conclude
the maker now has funds available, when both conclusions prove to be
wrong.
In examining the reasoning of the court in the principal case, we
find language which seems to question the court's own ruling. While
the court concludes that it is unnecessary to find an intent to forgive
the obligation, it reasons that the act of destruction is the highest
(1880) (Plaintiff, thinking maker of note had funds available, marked the note
paid but the maker did not have funds. An action -was found to exist.) ; Gleason
v. Brown, 129 Wash. 196, 224 Pac. 930 (1924) (Payee cashed a check after
maker's death. Upon advice he restored the money to the estate, and the court
held that the payee still had an action as the cancellation occurred through a
mistake of law.)
To the same effect are Prince v. Oriental Bank Corp., Eng., 3 App. Cas.
325 (1878) ; Warwick v. Rogers, Eng., 5 Man. & G. 340, 134 Eng. R. 595 (1843) ;
Raper v. Birkbeck, Eng., 15 East 17, 104 Eng. R. 750 (1812); Ward v. Wray,
Can., 23 Ont. W.N. 710, 9 Dom. L.R. 2 (1913).
North Carolina reaches the same result in Dewey v. Bowers, 26 N. C. 538
(1844). There defendant paid his note with a draft. Several days later, thinking the draft had been paid, plaintiff surrendered the note to defendant. No
discharge was found, the court looking to the intent of the parties. But cf. Hood
System Industrial Bank of High Point v. Dixie Oil Co., 205 N. C. 778, 172 S.E.
360 (1934).
Contra: Broad and Market Nat. Bank v. N. Y. & E. R. Co., 102 Misc. Rep.
82, 168 N. Y. Supp. 149 (Sup. Ct. 1917) (Plaintiff, thinking defendant had funds
available, accepted his check in payment of a note and marked the note paid. A
good discharge was found in that there was no fraud or mistake. However, the
court recognized the discharge would have been inoperative had the check been
accepted
only on condition that it had to be honored before payment was valid.)
"0 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 123, found at N. C. GEN. STAT. § 25-130
(1953).
"A cancellation made unintentionally, or under a mistake or without
the authority of the holder, is inoperative. . ."
17 State Street Trust Co. v. Muskogie Electric Trust Co., 204 F. 2d 920, 923
(10th Cir. 1953).
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evidence of such an intent.18 Had the court chosen to follow this line
of reasoning, there seems little doubt that the plaintiff would have
recovered, for the court admits there was no intent present to forgive
the debt itself. However, the court simply chooses to conclude that
regardless of the holder's over-all intent, so long as he intentionally
destroyed the instrument, the whole obligation is forgiven.
It would seem that under this strict interpretation of the statute,
even where the parties agreed to destroy the instrument but also expressly agreed that the debt should remain in existence, a discharge
of the obligation would nevertheless result because only the act of destruction is looked to, and if that be intentional, the debt is discharged.
It would further seem that even if a clear mistake of law or fact were
present, this rule would compel the discharge to be effective if the act
of cancelling the note is intentional, flying directly in the face of the
section of the statute that provides the discharge shall be inoperative if
made through mistake. 19 Surely the court would not intend to sanction such a result.
It is seriously questioned whether such a narrow interpretation is
desirable. The results indeed appear harsh. The maker has done
nothing in reliance on the destruction-in fact he was even ignorant
of the act. Therefore he would be done no harm had the court simply
said he was still liable. Whereas, by saying his liability was at an end,
the effect is to make a gift to him, while the holder certainly did not
intend to make a gift. The holder simply thought he would be unable
to collect the debt, and from this the court's conclusion in effect would
say that because he knowingly destroyed the instrument, he no longer
wanted to collect the debt. It is felt that justice would best be served
if, in each case, we were to look behind the destruction to discover
the true motive for it, rather than to apply the automatic rule of absolute discharge announced here.
DONALD

R. ERB

Bills and Notes-Renunciation of Rights by Holder Conditioned Upon
Holder's Death-Effect as Discharge of Parties Liable on Instrument
"There is some obscurity in the provisions of our statute," said a
New York court in its decision of a 1905 case' which hinged on the
interpretation of a section of the statute on negotiable instruments
then in force in that state 2 -a section virtually identical with the present
Section 122 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.8 A recent Virginia
IsId.at 922.
19 See note 16 supra.
2

Leask et al. v. Dew, 102 App. Div. 529, 92 N. Y. S. 891 (1st Dep't 1905).
N. Y. Laws 1897, c. 612, § 203.

'

"The holder may expressly renounce his rights against any party to the
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case, Farmer et al. v. Farmer,4 has called attention to the fact that a
half-century of judicial interpretation of Section 122 has not brought
forth much certainty as to what it does and does not allow the holder
of negotiable paper to accomplish by an attempted renunciation of his
rights against any party to the instrument. The problem before the
court was this: the payee-holder of a promissory note made by a nephew
and the nephew's wife, feeling that his death was relatively imminent
and not desiring that any payments on the instrument (an installment
note containing an acceleration clause) be made after his death, consulted his attorney and upon the latter's advice made this notation on
the instrument itself: "At my death this note is to be cancelled and
not to be collected. 5/1/48 [signed] P. W. Farmer." He subsequently made a similar notation on the mortgage deed of trust securing
the note, and died about a year later. His ancillary administrator filed
a bill in equity to have the note declared valid as against the makers,
the entire amount then being due under the acceleration clause because
one payment had not been made. The Supreme Court of Appeals, brushing aside the trial court's conclusions that the renunciation was ineffective because it was testamentary in character and because it did not
meet the requirements of a valid gift inter vivos, reversed a decree
that the obligation was still enforceable, and held (1) that the death
of the payee-holder had consummated a valid discharge begun by the
payee-holder's conditional renunciation, 'and (2) that Section 6-475
of the Virginia Code, the equivalent of N. I. L. § 122, does not deprive
a renunciation of its effect merely because it is conditional, the condition having occurred. 5
Obviously, the first problem posed by Section 122 is one of definition: what does the word "renounce" mean, as applied to a holder's
rights on a negotiable instrument? At English common law, before
the enactment of the Bills of Exchange Act of 1882,6 it was quite well
instrument, before, at or after its maturity. An absolute and unconditional renunciation of his rights against the principal debtor made at or after the maturity
of the instrument discharges the instrument. But a renunciation does not affect
the rights of a holder in due course without notice. A renunciation must be in
writing, unless the instrument is delivered up to the person primarily liable
thereon."
IVa. -,
77 S.E. 2d 415 (1953).
' The court did not decide whether the payee-holder could have revoked his
renunciation had he changed his mind prior to his death, or what the results
might have been had he sued for the entire amount upon the default in payment
which accelerated the maturity; it did indicate that, whatever its answers to
those problems might be, they would not influence the result reached in a situation
such as that presented by the Farmer case.
'45 &46 VICT., c. 61 (1882). Section 62, quite similar to N. I. L. § 122, reads
as follows:
"Express Waiver-(I) When the holder of a bill at or after its maturity
absolutely and unconditionally renounces his rights against the acceptor the bill is
discharged.
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settled that the holder of negotiable paper could discharge a party liable
thereon even by an oral statement of his intention so to do, with or
without consideration in return. 7 American courts, prior to the N. I.
L., never went so far as to validate an oral discharge made by the
holder without consideration. 8 Even attempts at gratuitous discharge
evidenced by a writing were held to be of no effect, the common law
of gifts being applied to find that there was no valid transfer of title
if the instrument itself were not delivered up. 9 The single case allowing effect to a gratuitous renunciation arrived at its result only by
treating what was actually "past" consideration as value sufficient to
support the discharge. 10 Thus both Section 62 of the Bills of Exchange
Act and Section 122 of the N. I. L. changed the law as it had existed
previously. These enactments purported to allow a "renunciation"
of the holder's rights against parties to negotiable instruments when
that renunciation was evidenced by a writing or by a surrender of the
instrument itself. In the light of the cases just considered, the result
was a restriction of the previous English doctrine of renunciation, and
an expansion of the American doctrine.
But did the "renunciation" referred to mean (1) a gratuitous abandonment of rights, (2) an abandonment of rights supported by a consideration, or (3) either type of abandonment? The first really thorough
consideration of the question did not come until 1932, and the case
then decided, Gannon v. Bronston," is still the best available judicial
discussion of the subject.' 2 Bronston, one of three makers of a note,
attempted, when sued by the holder, to set up as a defense an oral
"The renunciation must be in writing, unless the bill is delivered up to the
acceptor.
"(2) The liabilities of any party to a bill may in like manner be renounced
by the holder before, at, or after its maturity; but nothing in this section shall
affect the rights of a holder in due course without notice of the renunciation."
The use of the word "acceptor" rather than "holder" would seem at first glance
to restrict the application of Section 62 to bills of exchange only, and to exclude
promissory notes. Such is not the case, for Section 89(2) states: "In applying
these provisions the maker of a note shall be deemed to correspond to the acceptor
of a bill. .. "
"Foster v. Dawber, 6 Exch. 839, 155 Eng. Rep. 785 (1851). In Whatley v.
Tricker, 1 Camp. 35, 170 Eng. Rep. 867 (1807), the court held that, while the
fact that the renunciation in issue was oral did not alone deprive it of effect as a
discharge, the fact that it was not absolute and unconditional made it ineffective,
thus foreshadowing one of the problems faced by the Virginia court in the Farmer
case, one hundred and forty-six years later.
'Bradley v. Long, 33 S. C. Law (2 Strob.) 160, Book 14 S. C. Reports 161
(1847) ; Griffin et al. v. Simmons et al., 61 Tenn. 19 (1872).
' Hart et al. v. Strong et w., 183 Ill.
349, 55 N.E. 629 (1899); Bragg v.
Danielson, 141 Mass. 195, 4 N.E. 622 (1886).
10 Lowrey v. Danforth, 95 Mo. App. 441, 69 S.W. 39 (1902).
11246 Ky. 612, 55 S.W. 2d 358 (1932).
12 "The most notable thing in the case is the learned and thorough way in
which it was handled. It is believed that this is, perhaps, the most erudite opinion
to be found in the Kentucky Reports." Note, 22 Ky. L. J. 445, 448 (1934).
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discharge supported by consideration. The precise question facing the
court, therefore, was whether the words "renounce" and "renunciation," as used in N. I. L. Section 122, referred to discharges for a
valuable consideration and required such discharges to be in writing.
Collecting all the cases on the problem that it could find, the court
decided that the majority and preferable view was that "renunciation"
meant only the gratuitous abandonment of a right.'3 Such is still the
majority view today. 14 The minority view is that "renunciation" describes the abandonment of a right with or without consideration, and
that even discharges for a valuable consideration-that is, a consideration other than that which the instrument itself promises to give-must
be in writing or evidenced by a surrender of the instrument if they
are to be effective.' 5 The only North Carolina case passing on the
point adopts the minority view.1 No decisions handed down since
Gannon v. Brouton have espoused the minority view, 17 and the predominant contemporary American view is that a "renunciation," under
Section 122, is the gratuitous giving up of a right. The few law re" The rationale of the majority view seems to lean heavily on the history of
the common law "release." Such a "release" was a discharge, under seal, of
some existing obligation, the seal being used to import consideration and make

possible a gratuitous but legally effective giving up of rights on negotiable paper
or other contractual obligations. 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1820 (1938). The
English concept of gratuitously renouncing rights on negotiable paper seems, at
least in part, to have developed from an imitation of the law of France, where
the practice was known at a relatively early date and later codified. "Les obligations s'6teignent, par la paiement, par la novation, par ]a remise volontaire."
("Obligations are extinguished by payment, by novation, and by voluntary release.") FaEcH Civm CODE, Ann. by Blackwood Wright, c. 5, art. 1234. Such
were the germs of the renunciation provisions of the Bills of Exchange and
Negotiable Instruments Acts, runs the argument of the majority, and so the
modern statutory renunciation is held to be the gratuitous surrender of a right.
As we have seen, supra note 7, the English common law advanced to the point
of giving effect to an oral renunciation; the statutory requirement of a writing
seems to have been imported from the law of Scotland. 6 WILLISTON, CoNaAcTs
§ 1832 (1938).
" McCoun v. Shipman, 75 Ind. App. 212, 128 N.E. 683 (1920) ; Cardoza et al.
v. Leveroni, 233 Mass. 310, 123 N.E. 672 (1919); McGlynn v. Granstrom, 169
Minn. 164, 210 N.W. 892 (1926); Hazlehurst Oil Mill and Fertilizer Co. v.
Booze et al.,
160 Miss. 136, 133 So. 120 (1931) ; Barber v. Mallon et u r., 168
S.W. 2d 177 (Mo. App. 1943); English et al. v. Evans, 157 S.W. 2d 793 (Mo.
App. 1942); Nelson v. Hudson et al., 221 Mo. App. 211, 299 S.W. 1111 (1927);
Bank of Amsterdam v. Welliver et al., 215 Mo. App. 247, 256 S.W. 130 (1923);
Shaffer v. Akron Products Co., 91 Ohio App. 535, 109 N.E. 2d 24 (1952);
Johnston & Larimer Dry Goods Co. v. Helf et al., 178 Okla. 527, 63 P. 2d 681
(1936); Soab v. Clawson, 138 Okla. 126, 280 Pac. 598 (1929); Beach v. Bello
et al., 58 R. I. 445, 193 Atl. 526 (1937) ; Kohn et al. v. Zaludek, 38 S.W. 2d 110
(Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
" Whitcomb v. National Exch. Bank of Baltimore, 123 Md. 612, 91 Atl. 689
(1914) ; Portland Iron Works v. Siemens et al., 135 Ore. 219, 295 Pac. 463
(1931); Pitt et al. v. Little, 58 Wash. 355, 108 Pac. 941 (1910); Baldwin v.
Daly et al.,
41 Wash. 416, 83 Pac. 724 (1906).
1" Manly v. Beam, 190 N. C. 659, 130 S.E. 633 (1925).
17

See note 15 supra.
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view notes dealing with the subject consider this the preferable defini8
tion.'
Whatever their view as to the proper definition of "renunciation,"
all of the cases decided under the N. I. L., save for two, 1 hold that
a written, gratuitous, unconditional abandonment by a holder of his
rights against a party to negotiable paper will, except under certain
rather extraordinary circumstances, 20 discharge that party to the extent
of the renunciation. Generally, the cases also hold that the renunciation
must be in writing in order to be effective, although a few decisions
have pointed out specific common-sense exceptions from this requirement. 21
We have only three American cases dealing vith conditional renunciation in general, as distinguished from renunciation conditioned
upon death. In Dickinson v. Vail,22 the defendant surety, Vail, had
been discharged in writing (whether for or without a consideration is
not clear) upon the express condition that he was to pay the full amount
of the note if a suit were instituted against another surety and no recovery was had. Such an action was in fact begun, but the plaintiff
holder recovered nothing, because of her own negligence in failing to
give notice of appeal. An action was then brought against Vail, who
pleaded the written discharge. In a brief opinion, the court held that
Vail had been discharged despite the fact that the renunciation was
conditional and, interpreting the meaning of the word "unconditional"
in Section 122, said: "But this does not hinder such holder from conditionally releasing any of the parties to the note, including the principal
debtor. The statute merely affirms the effect of an absolute and unconditional renunciation to the principal debtor, but it does not prevent a renunciation that is not absolute and unconditional.1 2
8
Notes, 22 U. oF CIN. L. REv. 412 (1953), 9 U. OF CiN. L. REv. 90 (1935),
22 Ky. L. J. 445 (1934), 25 MicH. L. Rv. 782 (1927), 4 TULANE L. REV. 117
(1929).
"In Arnold v. Darby, 49 Ga. App. 629, 176 S.E. 914 (1934), the court held
that no discharge was valid without consideration. In Danis v. Angelo, 283
Mass. 324, 186 N.E. 558 (1933), there is dictum to the effect that a written
renunciation will not operate to discharge an instrument if the instrument itself
is not delivered up. The N. I. L. has been in effect in Georgia since 1924, and
in Massachusetts since 1898, and both states have the standard renunciation section. GA CoDE ANN. § 14-904 (1933); MAss. LAWs ANN. c. 107, § 145 (1946).
Clearly, both decisions were inadvertent.
2o Renunciation made under a mistake of fact does not discharge the instrument. Berryman v. Dore et al., 43 Idaho 327, 251 Pac. 757 (1926). To the same
effect, although no negotiable instrument involved, see United Fruit Co. v. United
States, 186 F. 2d 890 (1st Cir. 1951).
2 Estoppel may operate to make an oral renunciation effective as a discharge.
Bullock v. First Nat. Bank of Galva, f96 Iowa 522, 194 N.W. 930 (1923). Oral
renunciation, if made in open court, constitutes a valid discharge. Ginnet v.
Greene, 87 Wash. 40, 151 Pac. 99 (1915).
A written renunciation which has
been subsequently destroyed may be proved by competent evidence. Roth v.
Roth, 142 S.W. 2d 818 (Mo. App. 1940).
22 199 Mo. App. 458, 203 S.W. 635 (1918).
21Id. at 458, 203 S.W. at 636.

19541

NOTES AND COMMENT

In Bank of U. S. v. Manheim, 24 a court dealing with an entirely
different problem-an oral discharge supported by consideration-remarked in passing that "renunciation, unsupported by a consideration,
can be effected only by such writing as demonstrates a present, absolute,
and unconditional intention to renounce." 25
In 1950, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
speaking through Judge Learned Hand, reached a decision on the "unconditional" issue which, squarely supported by Dickinson v.Vail,26 and
opposed only by the dictum in Bank of U. S. v. Manheim,2 may well
be considered reputable authority on the effect of the "unconditional"
segment of Section 122. The case was New York, N.H. & H. R. Co.
v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation.28 The railroad sought to be
allowed to discharge at four per cent certain of its obligations held by
the finance corporation and calling for an interest of five per cent. A
letter written several years previously to the railroad by the finance
corporation, stating that four per cent would be accepted if all the notes
were paid, was introduced by the railroad as the basis of its claim
that only the lesser amount of interest was owed. Dickinson v. Vail29
had given judicial approval to a partial renunciation. But the finance
corporation contended that the conditional character of the renunciation,
in view of Section 122 of the N. I. L., made it ineffective as a discharge
of any part of the railroad's obligation. The court thought otherwise:
The question . . . is whether the limitation upon a renuncia-

tion, contained in the second sentence, should be imputed to the
first sentence, whenever the renunciation is at or after maturity.
The result of this would be either to limit the first sentence to
the period before maturity, or to make its words have one meaning before, and another after, maturity. Neither hypothesis is
permissible. The sentence expressly applies after maturity; and
the same words cannot change their meaning. Hence, even
though the result may be to make the second sentence redundant,
we must give the first sentence the unlimited scope to which the
words are entitled, and hold that it covers a conditional renunciation after maturity, unless the authorities have construed it
otherwise.8 0 (Italics supplied.)
The only authorities the court found were Dickinson v. Vail,3' which
2 264 N. Y. 45, 189 N.E. 776 (1934).
Id.
I2 at 48, 49, 189 N.E. at 776, 777.
" 199 Mo. App. 458, 203 S.W. 635 (1918).
27 264 N. Y. 45, 189 N.E. 776 (1934).
2.180 F. 2d 241 (2d Cir. 1950).

App. 458, 203 S.W. 635 (1918).
"199 Mo.
80 180 F. 2d 241, 245 (2d Cir. 1950).
" 199 Mo. App. 458, 203 S.W. 635 (1918).
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it noted as being consistent with its opinion, and Bank of U. S. v. Manheim.3 2 The court emphasized the fact that, in the latter case, there
was really no problem involving a renunciation to be passed on, although
"apparently the judge did suppose that all renunciations under §
122
had to be unconditional." 3 This holding was disapproved: "With
deference," said Hand, "this was plainly inadvertent; and we cannot
follow it."

4

All in all, the New Haven case seems to embody a well-considered
interpretation of the statute, although it is clear that Learned Hand's
typically subtle use of pure logic in writing off the "unconditional"
sentence of Section 122 as mere surplusage flies in the face of the
reasonable assumption that the writers of statutes do not generally
include entire sentences, and particularly sentences which partially contradict their own context, merely for decorative effect.3a Unfortunately,
an examination of three editions of the negotiable instruments statute
as annotated by Mr. John J. Crawford, the draftsman of the Uniform
Act, affords us scant information as to what Mr. Crawford had in
mind when he created Section 122.36

In reaching its result in Farmer v. Farmer, the Virginia court gave
great weight to Judge Learned Hand's decision.3 7 But the result in
the Virginia case represents a departure from the previous norm in
American cases where the renunciation was conditioned upon the holder's death, assuming that the small number of cases we have in the
subject can be said to have formulated any norm.38 Only two such
N. Y. 45, 189 N.E. 776 (1934).
180 F. 2d 241, 245 (2d Cir. 1950).
Ibid.
One interpretation which seems sound and which at least partially explains
the apparent conflict within Section 122 has been offered in a work now out of
date but certainly worth quoting on this point: "The second sentence provides
for discharge of the entire instrument where the renunciation is in favor of the
'principal debtor,' and made 'at or after maturity.' If made before inalnrity the
effect would be to discharge the principal debtor under the first sentence; with
the consequences provided in § 120(5), namely, that by release of the principal
debtor all parties are discharged, but not so as to affect the rights of a holder
in due course should the instrument thereafter be re-issued and circulated before
maturity." BIGELOW, THE LAW OF BILLS, NOTES, AND CHECKS § 580 (3d ed. by
Lile, 1928).
36CRAWFORD,
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW ANNOTATED § 203 (1897);
CRAWFORD, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW ANNOTATED § 203 (3d ed. 1908);
CRAWFORD, NEGOTIABLE IN STRUMENTS LAW ANNOTATED § 122 (Rev. ed. 1916).
.7
Va. , 77 S.E. 2d 415, 418, 419 (1953).
"8The Farmer case is, however, in accord with certain English cases decided
before the adoption of the Bills of Exchange Act. In Wekett v. Raby, 2 Bro.
P.C. 386, 1 Eng. Rep. 1014 (1724), the deceased holder had left the note in an
envelope which also contained, on a separate paper, this written declaration of
renunciation: "I have Raby's bond, which I keep; I don't deliver it up, for I
may live to want it more than he; but when I die he shall have it, he shall not
be asked or troubled for it." The court held that the debt was discharged. In Aston v. Pye, 5 Ves. 350, 31 Eng. Rep. 528 (1788), the renunciation was at
least impliedly conditioned upon the holder's death. He had made an addition
22264
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cases, to which the N. I. L. could be applied, seem to have been reported
prior to the Virginia decision, and both were decided by the same intermediate appellate court.
Dimnon v. Keery39 involved the writing on a note by the payee-holder,
at the time of its making, of the words: "At my death the above note
becomes null and void. Stephen C. Dimon." The court completely
failed to consider the quite obvious possibility that the notation might
have been an actual term of the contract represented by the instrument.40 Nor was the then-prevailing New York statute on negotiable
instruments 4 ' (in which the renunciation section, 42 but for two harmless
extra

commas, was identical with the

present Section

122 of the

N. I. L.) mentioned at all. Without admitting that the occurrence of
the condition-the death of the holder-had operated to make the note
null and void, the court stated that, even if this were so, the pre-existing
obligation which the note had been issued to cover still existed. Applying the common law of gifts, it thought the renunciation ineffective
because it indicated mere donative intent, not consummated by delivery.
Clearly this decision ought not to be cogent precedent in any future
conditional renunciation case, since (1) it cited no common law authorto his will, stating that the maker "pays no interest, nor shall I ever take the
principal unless greatly distressed." The writing was held not valid as a disposition of property by will, apparently for lack of the requisite formality, but
it was held effective as a discharge of the maker's obligation on the note, the
holder having died. These results are not surprising when we remember the
generally liberal English common law attitude toward the renunciation of contract rights. (See notes 7 and 13 supra.)
Under the Bills of Exchange Act, one English case has denied effect to a renunciation which was perhaps impliedly, but certainly not expressly, conditioned
upon the holder's death. Re George, Francis v. Bruce, L.R. 44 Ch. D. 627 (1890).
There the deceased holder had desired to destroy the instrument, but was not
able to find it; he therefore had his nurse make a written memorandum of his
desires: "It is by Mr. George's dying wish that the cheque for f2000 money lent
to Mrs. Francis be destroyed as soon as found." Although this writing was signed
only by the nurse, the court did not decide whether the signature of the holder
himself was one of the requirements for a valid renunciation. The principal
reason advanced for denying effect to the renunciation was that, as far as the
court was concerned, it could have been revoked by the deceased at any time
prior to his death-the precise point which the Virginia court, in the Fariner
case, did not decide and thought unimportant. At any rate, as a New York
court which later considered the English case was quick to note, the renunciation involved was actually unconditional. Leask et al. v. Dew, 102 App. Div.
529, 92 N. Y. S. 891 (1st Dep't 1905).
"54 App. Div. 318, 66 N. Y. S. 817 (1st Dep't 1900).
"When the contract of making states that the note is to be discharged as
against certain parties upon the death of some human being (usually the holder),
the death will operate as a discharge. This is a matter of simple contract law.
Pyle v. East et al., 173 Iowa 165. 155 N.W. 283 (1915) ; De Lapp et 0. v. Anderson's Adm'r., 305 Ky. 336, 203 S.W. 2d 389 (1947); Daugherty v. Preuitt, 113
Okla. 66, 242 Pac. 529 (1925).
Clearly the inclusion of such a condition in an
instrument conditions the promise to pay and renders the instrument nonnegotiable. N. I. L. § 1 (2).
"' N. Y. Laws 1897, c. 612. The Uniform Act was not adopted in New York
until 1909. N. Y. Laws 1909, c. 43.
2 N. Y. Laws 1897, c. 612, § 203.
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ity for its conclusion, and (2) it did not even purport to be an interpretation of the negotiable instruments statute.
Five years later the same court, in Leask et al. v. Dew,4a faced almost exactly the same problem, and reached the same result, using
somewhat better reasoning in the process. 44 The deceased holder of
a note had left it in an envelope, along with a dated, signed, and witnessed written notation on a separate piece of paper: "The enclosed
note I wish to be cancelled in case of my death, and if the law does
not allow it I wish you to notify my heirs that it is my wish and orders."
The court recognized the common law holding in Wekett v. Raby45
that such an attempt at discharge might be effective, and frankly admitted that the renunciation section of the applicable New York
statute46 was not clear in its terms. The fact that the deceased had used
the precatory word "wish," rather than some more forceful expression, was seized upon in order to support the argument that there
was really no "renunciation." But the major reason for the court's
denying effect to the renunciation seems to have been its feeling that
the note might have been enforced anyway by the holder before his
death, if he had simply changed his mind. "Had it been delivered to
the defendant during the lifetime of the testator, it would not have
precluded the latter at any time upon maturity from enforcing the
note." 47 The possibility that this might have happened seems to be a
specter that rises before the courts in all of these cases. At any rate,
this was the last reported decision, prior to the Farmer case, dealing
with renunciation conditioned upon the holder's death. 48
"102 App. Div. 529, 92 N. Y. S. 891 (1st Dep't 1905).

"In both cases, the court was composed of five justices and handed down a

unanimous decision. Justice Ingraham, who wrote the opinion in Dimon v. Keery,
54 App. Div. 318, 66 N. Y. S.817 (1st Dep't 1900), sat on the court which decided Leask et al. v. Dew, 102 App. Div. 529, 92 N. Y .S. 891 (1st Dep't 1905),

as did two other judges who had concurred in the decision of the former case.
One of those two, Justice Hatch, wrote the opinion in the latter. Thus threefifths of the court sitting on the 1905 case had a rather compelling reasonpersonal consistency-for deciding as they had in the earlier case. Hence, it
would be quite inaccurate to say that two different courts have ruled against
the effectiveness of the renunciation conditioned upon death.
"2 Bro. P.C. 386, 1 Eng. Rep. 1014 (1724), discussed su pra note 36.
N. Y. Laws 1897, c. 612, § 203.
N8
,7102 App. Div. 529, 92 N. Y. S.891, 895 (1st Dep't 1905).
48 Interesting cases dealing with closely related problems have arisen.
One
line of English cases reveals a method of effecting renunciations which an
American attorney, when confronted with the proper fact situation, might at
least want to test. The English courts have held that the naming of the maker
of a negotiable instrument as executor of the holder will discharge the instrument
in law at the holder's death, to avoid the possible anomaly of the maker's bringing an action against himself to enforce the obligation, and that the maker is
then liable only in equity, there to account for the amount of the instrument
in an administration proceeding. In re Bourne, [1906] 1 Ch. 697; Freakley v.
Fox, 9 B. & C. 130, 109 Eng. Rep. 49 (1829); Cheetham v. Ward, 1 B. & P.
630, 126 Eng. Rep. 1102 (1797) ; Wankford v. Wankford, I Salk. 299, 91 Eng.

Rep. 265 (1699?).

Section 61 of the Bills of Exchange Act, providing that an
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One North Carolina case, Parker v. Mott,49 has dealt with a renunciation which, while not in the main conditioned upon 'death, was
certainly made in contemplation of death. The payee-holder went to
an attorney's office, related her intention to make a gift of the principal
to the makers, and pursuant to the attorney's advice made a signed
notation on the instrument: "This note is hereby assigned, the interest
to be paid me during my life, and at my death the note is to be delivered." The Supreme Court held that the makers were discharged
of their obligation to pay the principal as soon as the notation was made,
and of their obligation to pay the interest, the holder having died. The
immediate transfer of "title" to the principal was said to validate the
transaction under the law of gifts, it not being necessary to transfer
the note itself since such transfer would have been inconsistent with
the holder's desire to take the interest for life. 50 Whether the notation
meant to say that interest should be paid during the holder's entire
life, even after the maturity date of the note if the holder had lived for
such a length of time, was a point not raised; until we have a judicial
answer to the question, makers of notes might do well to refuse the
holder's "gift" made on such terms, where there is reason to suspect
that the holder may live for a considerable period. At any rate, Parker
v. Mott seems to give North Carolina attorneys an effective means of
accomplishing what was achieved in the Farmer case, but with the
rather severe limitation that the immediate assignment of principal used
instrument may be discharged by the maker's coming into possession of it "in
his own right"-language much like that of N. I. L. § 119(5)-has been held
not to exclude discharge by his coming into possession "in a representative
capacity." Jenkins v. Jenkins, [1928] 2 K.B. 501. (Here, the note in question
was made by several parties, only one of whom had been named executor of
the deceased holder. Nevertheless, the court held that all the makers were released at law, but indicated that the executor could probably bring them in for
contribution when he accounted in equity to the holder's estate.
One English case, not involving a negotiable instrument, has held that the
executor debtor can avoid even the obligation to account in equity by introducing
any competent evidence, including oral statements of the deceased, to show that
the deceased testator-creditor did not intend that the obligation should be enforced
after his death. In re Applebee, [1891] 3 Ch. 422. And it has been held immaterial whether the making of the will preceded or was subsequent to the incurrence of the debt. Jenkins v. Jenkins, [1928] 2 K.B. 501.
The application of these rules in a proper case might well allow discharge
by methods far more flexible than even a liberal interpretation of the negotiable
instruments statutes taken alone would seem to make possible. However, one
American case has held that a party is not discharged under N. I. L. § 119(5)
by acquiring an instrument "purely in a representative capacity." Schwartzman v.
Post et al., 84 N. Y. S. 922, 924 (Sup. Ct. 1903).
"181 N. C. 435, 107 S.E. 500 (1921).
"To say that "title" passes when a creditor forgives a debtor his obligation
leaves something to be desired insofar as accuracy in expressing what actually
happens is concerned. Speaking of "title" as if the obligation were a material
entity seems to involve an unnecessary venture into the realm of metaphysics.
The point is a small one, but the court would have been more accurate if it had
referred to what took place as an "immediate, absolute, unconditional renunciation of the holder's right to collect the principal from the maker."
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in Parker v. Mott precludes the holder's subsequently changing his
mind and enforcing the entire obligation. Whether a holder who had
renounced conditionally could still enforce his note we do not know,
but certainly he could not do so when he had already passed "title"
to the principal. Therefore it would seem that the safest means of effecting a conditional renunciation revocable on change of mind before death
would be for the holder to include in his will a provision leaving the
note to the maker, 5 since a will is generally revocable at any time before
52
the testator's death.
It is submitted that the Virginia court's decision in the Farmer case
is commendable. The New Haven case,53 while it did not dispel all
doubts about the meaning of Section 122, is certainly reputable authority for the proposition that conditional renunciations in general ought
to be held effective when the condition has occurred. There is no
good reason for drawing a distinction in cases'where the renunciation
is conditioned upon the holder's death, the only immediately obvious
difference being that the introduction of the element of death into any
sort of transfer traditionally raises the issue of "testamentary disposition." But this issue the Virginia court, probably wisely, did not consider material for the purposes of its decision.5 4 True, the conditional
renunciation, even if itself revoked, would, if written on the instrument
or known to a prospective holder, prabably destroy negotiability in fact,
if not in law, but the destruction of negotiability is the holder's risk,
and in any event is no detriment to a dead holder whose intention
while he lived was that the note should not be paid after his death.
The question of whether a conditional renunciation, once made, can be
revoked before the occurrence of the condition, can be answered when
and if it arises, but neither the answer nor its contemplation ought to
block the giving of effect to the desires of a holder who has died without
revoking.
So long as Section 122 of the N. I. L. retains its present wording,
it will be a source of confusion in many of the cases to which it will
be applied. A carefully phrased replacement section is called for, and
the proposed Uniform Commercial Code discloses one possibility.r 5
" For an example of the use of this method of discharge, see Feulner v. Gillam,
211 ZIll.
App. 348 (1918).
2
ATKINSON, WILLS

§ 152 (1937).
180 F. 2d 241 (2d Cir. 1950).
" "We are not concerned with whether the notations are 'testamentary in
character,' or whether the transaction meets the requirements of a valid gift inter
zivos to the makers of the balance due on the note at the holder's death. The
single issue is whether the notations on the note and deed of trust, or either of

them, satisfy the requirements of Code, § 6-475, so as to constitute a renunciation by the holder of his rights against the makers." Va. - , 77 S.E. 2d
415, 417 (1953).
" "Cancellation and Renunciation.
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The recent Virginia decision represents the broad and salutary general
philosophy that the courts, absent some clear restriction of law or of
public policy, ought not to block the attainment of human desires. For
so long a time as we shall have to operate under the present Section
122, it is to be hoped that this philosophy will prevail in its interpretation.
J. V. HUNTER
Criminal Law-Banishment
Recently a sentence of two years on the roads was suspended on
condition that the defendant leave the State of North Carolina for two
years. The Supreme Court of this State held that this was in all practical effect a sentence of banishment, and as such, was void.1 What
then is banishment, and how does it fit into our legal scheme of things?
In one form or another, banishment, or transportation, 2 has been
known in Europe from ancient times as a punishment for crime. In
one form, deportatio, it was introduced by Augustus into the Roman
law of that age and, gradually superceding exile,3 was by no means an
uncommon punishment. 4 In another form, abjuration, it was known
in the kingdoms founded upon the wreckage of Imperial Rome 5 and
later appeared in the early Anglo-Saxon laws of Alfred.6 The accused
would flee to a sanctuary, which generally was holy ground, where he
would confess his crime and swear to leave the realm, on no occasi6n
to return without permission from the Crown. This, Blackstone points
out, was not strictly a punishment, but rather was in the nature of a
"(1) The holder of an instrument may even without consideration discharge any
party
(a) by intentionally cancelling the instrument or the party's signature by
destruction or mutilation, or by writing 'cancelled' or equivalent words across
the instrument or against the signature; or
(b) by renouncing his rights by a signed writing or by surrender of the
instrument to the party to be discharged.
"(2) Neither cancellation nor renunciation without surrender of the instrument
affects the title thereto." Uniform Commercial Code, § 3-605 (Official Draft
1952). Subsection (2) is difficult to comprehend and might well be clarified or
omitted in future drafts.
1State v. Doughtie, 237 N. C. 368, 74 S. E. 2d 923 (1953).
2 It is unnecessary to distinguish here between banishment and transportation
since the result in each is the same. Technically, however, banishment "is inflicted principally upon political offenders, 'transportation' being the word used
to express a similar punishment of ordinary criminals. Banishment, however,
merely forbids the return of the person banished before the expiration of the
sentence, while transportation involves the idea of deprivation of liberty after
the convict arrives at the place to which he has been carried." BLACK'S LAw DicTIONARY, Banishment (4th ed. 1951).
'BUCKLAND, A TExT-Boox OF ROMAN LAW 98 (1921).
' 1 PIKE, A HISTORY OF CRIME IN ENGLAND 16 (1876).
'3 HOLDSWoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 303 (3rd ed. 1923).
e Laws of Alfred, c. 5, cited in 3 HoLDswoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW

(3rd ed. 1923).
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condition to pardon.7 Because abjuration offered a means of escaping,
with one's head, the consequences of his crime, it became more an incentive to crime than a deterrent, and for this reason it was abolished
in 1604.8 It had one important effect, however: it established the
validity of the sovereign's attaching to a pardon the condition that one
pardoned leave a prescribed place, either for a specified term or for
life. 9
From the reign of Charles II, banishment became a not infrequent
condition and has consistently been held valid since that time in the
courts of both Great Britain 0 and the United States." The usual
approach by the bench in recognizing its validity as a condition is that
the power of the sovereign (or in the United States, the executive) to
grant a pardon includes the lesser power to grant a conditional pardon,
2
so long as it is neither immoral, illegal, nor impossible of performance.1
Since such a condition is obviously neither immoral nor impossible, it
was argued in Ex parte Snyder' 3 that a condition that the parolee leave
the State of Oklahoma for twenty years was in conflict with the Constitution of that State, which provides that "no person shall be transported
out of the state for any offense committed within the state. . . .,14 It
was held, however, that this was not involuntary transportation. Rather,
"the parole with all the conditions set forth therein was a matter which
'4 BLACKSTONI'S COMMENTARIES 332 (Sharswood's Ed. 1885) ; 8 C.J.S., Banishinent p. 385 (1938).
,"So much of all statutes as concerneth abjured persons and sanctuaries ...
shall stand repealed and be void." 1 JAMES I, c. 25, §34 (1604). See also 20
JAMES I, c. 18 (1624).
'8 C. J. S., Banishment p. 385 (1938). See also 7 BACON'S ABRIDGMENT 412,
as quoted in 4 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 40 (Sharswood's Ed. 1885). "It
seems agreed that the king may extend his mercy on whatever terms he pleases,
and consequently may annex to his pardon any condition that he thinks fit."
10 In one of the very earliest reported cases, the condition was that the criminal

"go beyond the seas for five years." Copeland's Case, J. Kel. 45, 84 Eng. Rep.
1075 (1665).
" State v. Fuller, 1 McCord 178 (S. C. 1821); State v. Chancellor, 1 Strob.
347 (S. C. 1847); State v. Barnes, 32 S. C. 14, 10 S. E. 611, 17 Am. St. Rep.
832 (1889) ; Ex parte Hawkins, 61 Ark. 321, 33 S.W. 106 (1895) ; Exr parte Snyder, 81 Okla. Cr. Rep. 34, 159 P. 2d 752 (1945). The above pardons were all
granted on condition that the prisoner leave the state. Perhaps the most interesting condition was that "on or before the last of the said month of April," the
prisoner was to "depart from and out of the United States of America, and never
return to the same"-this from a state court. It was upheld on the ground that,
while the governor's authority did not extend beyond the borders of the state, it
was sufficient validly to impose such a condition. People v. Potter, 1 Parker, C. R.
47 (N. Y. 1845). The same conclusion has been reached in a Federal court.
Kavalin v. White, 44 F. 2d 49 (10th Cir. 1930).
12 Kavalin v. White, supra note 11.
The power to grant pardons is provided
the governor by every state constitution. Power to grant conditional pardons is
generally granted by statute, but may be found in some state constitutions. For
example, the governor of North Carolina may grant pardons "subject to such
conditions, restrictions, and limitations as he thinks proper and necessary .
N. C.
Co T. Art. III, § 6; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 147-23 (1952).
'3 Ex parte Snyder, 81 Okla. Cr. Rep. 34, 159 P. 2d 752 (1945).
"OKLA. CoNsT. Art. II, § 29.
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the petitioner could accept or reject. He voluntarily [italics added] left
the state," hence, a lawful condition. It is upon this peg that most
courts hang their decisions.
On the other hand, banishment as a direct punishment has found
a less ready acceptance in the English-speaking world, although it is
today an integral part of the law of several nations, among which are
Spain,' 5 France,'1 Italy,1 7 and the Philippines.' 8 While it was definitely
known as a punishment in England in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, it had become obsolescent by 1300, not being revived until the
practice of transporting criminals to the colonies was begun in 1597.19
In that year a statute was passed providing that convicted rogues, vagabonds, and beggars "be banyshed out of this realm and all domynions
thereof." 20 From that time until 1864, Parliament at frequent intervals
passed new statutes reaffirming the use of this punishment.
In the United States, however, banishment has not found even that
passing measure of acceptance. American decisions have held invalid
not only banishment from the country2' and the state,2 but also banishment from the county, 23 city, 4 and neighborhood 25 as well. In fact,
" Legarda v. Valdez, 1 Philippine 146 (1902).
0
Ibid.
17 Ibid.
Is Ibid.
203
HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 304 (3rd ed. 1923).
2°39
ELIZ. I, c. 4 (1597) ; see also 14 CA. II, c. 12, §§ 16, 23 (1662), reenacting the original statute. At this early date (1662), America -was the principal recipient of banished convicts. After a lapse of forty-six years, transportation to America was restored on a greatly extended scale by 4 GEo. I, c. 11 (1717),
but was of course halted by the American Revolution. This practice was continued, Australia being the chief recipient, until it was gradually abolished between 1853 and 1864, primarily because of objections by the colonies themselves
to receiving convicts sentenced to them. IvEs, A HISTORY OF PENAL METHODS
109, 146 (1914). See also 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRImINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 482 (1883).
1In
People v. Lopez, 81 Cal. App. 100, 253 Pac. 169 (1927), the trial court
declared that "after sentence has been served, the defendant is to be deported to
Mexico." The appellate court said, "there is no authority of law by which the
state courts can make a valid order of this character ....
It follows, therefore,
that the judgment is void." Id. at 103, 253 Pac. at 171.
2 People v. Baum, 251 Mich. 187, 231 N.W. 95 (1930).
The defendant was
ordered by the trial court to "leave the State of Michigan within thirty days
and not return for the period of probation," which was five years. The Supreme
Court said (in reversing) in unequivocal terms that "to permit one state to

dump its convict criminals into another would entitle the state believing itself
injured thereby to exercise its police and military power, in the interest of its

own peace, safety, and welfare, to repel such an invasion.

It would tend to

incite dissension, provoke retaliation, and disturb that fundamental equality of
political rights among the several states which is the basis of the Union itself."

Id. at 189, 231 N.W. at 96.
" Ex parte Scarborough, 76 Cal. App. 2d 648, 173 P. 2d 825 (1946). "The
same principle which prohibits the banishment of a criminal from a state or from
the United States applies with equal force to a county or city." Id. at 652, 173
P. 2d at 827.
24

Ibid.

People v. Smith et at., 252 Mich. 4, 232 N.W. 397 (1930). The defendants
were placed on probation and ordered to move out of the neighborhood in which
they lived. Held, that part of the order "was without authority of law." Id. at
5, 232 N.W. 397.
25

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. ,32

the constitutions of several states expressly forbid it,20 and in states
not having such provisions, it is recognized that historically, banishment was unknown to the common law2 7 and must therefore have
statutory sanction before being legally imposed.28 While no state has
such a statute, there seems to be little doubt that in those states having
no constitutional prohibitions against it, such a statute would receive
approval in the courts, as several cases and text-writers have intimated.2 9 It is not likely that a statute of this type would be held unconstitutional on the ground that it authorizes cruel and unusual punishment, since it has been established on numerous occasions that, while
as a punishment banishment is unusual, it cannot be considered cruel.Y°
Chief among the objections that would probably arise would be that
it is contrary to sound public policy3 ' and that it violates Article IV,
§ 2, of the United States Constitution, dealing with the rights of citizenship. It is highly doubtful whether such a sentence would serve any
practical purpose, however, since once beyond the borders of the state,
the convict would be beyond any effort of the state either to restrain
him or to aid in his rehabilitation.
The practical equivalent of banishment has of course been accomplished by means other than direct sentence, a practice which has led
to conflicting and sometimes confusing decisions. This is as true in
North Carolina as elsewhere. For example, where the defendant's sentence was suspended for thirty days upon payment of costs with the further provision that "if thereafter the defendant be found within the State
of North Carolina, capias shall issue . . . and upon apprehension the
defendant shall be committed to serve the sentence imposed,"8 2 the
court held that this was not a suspension of sentence on condition that
the defendant leave the state to avoid imposition of the sentence.8 3
Again, where the court ordered that the defendants "be imprisoned for
twelve months in the county jail, but if the defendants leave the state
"ARK. CONST. Art. II, § 21; GA. CoNsT. Art. I, § 7; ILL. CoNsr. Art. II, §

11; KAN s. CONST., Bill of Rights, § 12; N. C. CONST. Art. I, § 17; OHIO CoNsT.
Art. I, § 12; OKLA. CONsT. Art. II, § 29; TEx. CoNsT. Art. I, § 20.
"' BisHoP, CRIMINAL LAW § 939 (7th ed. 1882). See also Rex v. Lewis, 1
Moody, C. C. 372, 168 Eng. Rep. 1308 (1832); Bullock v. Dodds, 2 Barn. and
Ald. 258, 106 Eng. Rep. 361 (1819).
28 15 Am. JiR., Criminal Law § 453 (1938) ; 24 C. J. S., Criminal Law § 1991
(1941).
29 Millsaps v. Strauss, 208 Ark. 265, 185 S.W. 2d 933 (1945) ; Ex pare Scarborough, 76 Cal. App. 2d 648, 173 P. 2d 825 (1946) ; People v. Baum, 251 Mich.
187, 231 N.W. 95 (1930) ; Ex parte Sheehan, 100 Mont. 244, 49 P. 2d 438 (1935);
Note, 26 ILL. L. REV. 81 (1931) ; 24 C. J. S., Criminal Law § 1991 (1941).
" Ex parte Sheehan, supra note 29; Legarda v. Valdez, 1 Philippine 146
(1902).
"1The court said in People v. Baum, 251 Mich. 187, 189, 231 N.W. 95, 96
(1930), "Such a method is . . . impliedly prohibited by public policy."
" State v. McAfee, 189 N. C. 320, 127 S.E. 204 (1925).
33 Ibid.
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within thirty days, no capiasto issue," 34 the court held that this was not
a sentence of banishment.35 But recently in State v. Doughtie,36 the
court said,
A sentence of banishment is undoubtedly void. A sentence suspended on cofidition that the defendant leave the State of North
Carolina is in all practical effect a sentence of banishment. It
gives the defendant no opportunity to avoid serving the road
sentence except by exile.
This would seem to indicate a trend by the court away from sentences
37
It
and conditions that by subtle interpretation result in banishment.
certainly seems to recognize the fact that the place for the State's criminals is within the borders of the State. Otherwise, these unwilling
expatriates would be foisted upon the no less unwilling citizens of other
states and any duty to restrain or rehabilitate them would go unattended.
MYRON C. BANKS

Labor Law-the Bargainability of Company Housing
Is company housing a subject of mandatory collective bargaining
within the purview of the terms "wages" and "conditions of employment" as used in Section 9 (a) of the Labor-Management Relations
Act ?' In recent cases before the Courts of Appeals, a conflict has arisen,
the Fourth Circuit holding that company housing is 2 and the Fifth Circuit that it is not 3 bargainable.
" State v. Hatley et aL., 110 N. C. 522, 14 S.E. 751 (1892).

See also. Ex

Parte Hinson, 156 N. C. 250, 252, 72 S.E. 310, 311 (1911), where defendant was

told that if she left the county and did not return, she would not be imprisoned,
and the clerk -was directed not to issue capias for fifteen days, the court said,
"The opportunity which withholding of the catnias afforded defendant to escape
was not a decree of banishment. There was nothing requiring her to leave. If
she left, it was of her own free will and accord." Could this course be called
strictly voluntary, when the only other course open to the defendant is a term
in jail?
State v. Hatley et al., 110 N. C. 522, 14 S.E. 751 (1892).
a6237 N. C_. 368,74 S.E. 2d 923 (1953).
Yet the court indicates that this decision does not bear directly on the decisions reached in State v. Hatley, 110 N. C. 522, 14 S.E. 751 (1892) ; Ex parte
Hinson, 156 N. C. 250, 72 S.E. 310 (1911) ; and State v. McAfee, 189 N. C. 320,
127 S.E. 204 (1925).
For other reasons holding invalid a suspension of sentence on condition that
the defendant leave a specified locale, see: Ex parte Scarborough, 73 Cal. App.
2d 648, 173 P. 2d 825 (1946) ("Unlawful increase of punishment not provided
by statute") ; Ex parte Sheehan, 100 Mont. 244, 49 P. 2d 438 (1935) ("In nature
of a pardon on condition . . . the court sought to exercise a power which the
Constitution reposes in the Governor and the board of pardons"); State v.
Doughtie, mtprac note 36 ("It is not sound public policy").
'29 U. S. C. § 159 (a) (Supp. 1952).
'N.
L. R. B. v. Portland Cement Co., 205 F. 2d 821 (4th Cir. 1953).
3
N. L. R. B. v. Bemis Bros. Bag Co., 206 F. 2d 33 (5th Cir. 1953). The
Fifth Circuit did conclude, however, that the subject might be bargainable under
proper circumstances.
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Company housing is the outgrowth of the development of the factory
system in New England. It dates back to the year 1791 when the growing concentration of job-producing machines and the immobility of the
worker made it necessary to furnish housing facilities in order to secure an adequate working force. From this has grown the present
company-owned village, which is most prevalent today in the mining,
metallurgical, lumber, and textile industries. The percentage of employees using company houses varies from a low of fifteen percent in
the copper and gold mining industries, to a high of near seventy percent
4
in Southern textiles.
The popularity of company housing, from the employers' viewpoint,
stems from a need for certain types of emergency employees near the
work location, a desire for a more stable labor supply, and a belief that
a more efficient labor force is secured.5 From the employees' viewpoint the reasons most frequently given are that it provides homes near
the job, low rentals, and special favors such as decreasing, deferring, or
cancelling the rental during sickness or shutdown."
Presently there is a movement on the part of Southern textile manufacturers to rid themselves of company housing. This is being accomplished primarily through the sale of such houses to employees. By
1940, of over eight hundred textile concerns owning company houses in
the Carolinas, Virginia, Georgia, and Alabama, approximately sixteen
percent had sold either all or part of such holdings.7 Advocates advance
the following reasons for this movement: company housing is no longer
needed in order to secure an adequate supply of trained labor; capital
tied up may be freed for use in the enterprise itself; maintenance costs
place the company at a competitive disadvantage; higher wages have
made home ownership more practicable; workers not so housed complain of the unfairness of having to house their families elsewhere at
a greater expense; industrial managers should not be burdened with
real estate problems; paternalism of the mill village is no longer needed;
and the houses have long since been written off the company books for
tax purposes. Further, it is hoped that home ownership will make for
more responsible citizens and better communities and lessen the workers'
interest in union activities since a worker in the act of purchasing a
home may hesitate to risk security for possible gains through union

affiliation.8
" MAGNUSSON, lousing by the Employers in the United States, BUREAU OF
LABOR STATIsTIcs BULL. No. 263 (1920).
See also LAHNE, THE CorroN MILL

WORKER (1944), where author concludes percentage in Southern textiles during
early forties to be nearer 60%.
MAGNUSSON, supra at 15.
'Regarding such practice in Southern textiles see LAHNE, supra at 39.
1 HERRING, PASSING OF THE MILL VI LAGE 123 (1949).

SId. at 126, 127. Houses have been sold almost exclusively to employees at
prices well below fair market value, and payments extended over periods varying
from five to twelve years.
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Does the duty of the employer to bargain collectively as to "rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment"
under Sections 8 (a) (5) and 9 (a) of the Tgft-Hartley Act, extend to
company housing?9
This question was first before the National Labor Relations Board
under Section 8 (3) of the Wagner Act which provided, as does the
present Taft-Hartley Act, that there should be no discrimination by the
employer "in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization."' 0 The question was presented in the Great
Western Mushroom Company case" in 1940. The company furnished
rent-free housing to its employees only during their employment tenure,
and when threatened by union activity promptly sought from all employees an agreement not to strike, or in the alternative, to face eviction.
The Board found this a discriminatory labor practice, and that the
housing constituted a part of the employees' "wages."
The question was again before the Board the following year in the
Abbott Mills case.' 2 Company housing was furnished only to employees, and at a rental approximately one-third that of the surrounding
area, and leases provided for immediate eviction in any except temporary lay offs. The Board, in ordering reinstatement in jobs and
houses, held occupancy by the employees to be "in effect a part of
their wages and ... a term and condition of their employment . . ."13
In 1943,14 the Board faced a situation in which the employer, who
maintained company houses solely for the use of his employees during
employment, discharged employees for union activities and after such
discharge evicted them from their company houses. The Board found
discrimination and required reinstatement of the employees in jobs and
homes, and ruled that the "use and occupancy of such company owned
houses" was "a right and privilege of their former employment."' 5
These latter words have since been construed by the Board to mean
"conditions of employment" within the purview of Section 9 (a) of
the Taft-Hartley Act.' 6
Although the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 made no changes in the
text of the Wagner Act as to the subject matter of compulsory bargain'29 U. S. C. A. 158 (a) (5) and 159 (a) (Supp. 1952).

1049 STAT. 449, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (3) (1946) (N. L. R. A.); 29 U. S. C. A. §
(3) (Supp.
1952) (L.M. R. A.).
158 1127
(a) N.
L. R. B. 352 (1940).
1236 N. L. R. B. 545 (1941) enforcement granted, 127 F. 2d 438 (1st Cir.
1942).
23 Id. at 556.
1 Industrial Cotton Mills Co., 50 N. L. R. B. 855 (1943).
" Id. at 855.
"' Bemis Bros. Bag Co., 96 N. L. R. B. 728, 730, n. 4 (1951).
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7

ing, the Board and the courts in the hiland Steel' (pensions) and
W. W. Cross'8 cases, extended the scope of bargainable subjects by
broad interpretations of the statutory terms "wages" and "conditions
of employment." 19
In the West Bolston case 20 of 1949 the Board for the first time
clearly held company housing to be a subject of mandatory collective
bargaining. In this instance the company promised to consult the union
before deciding to evict any employees from their company-owned
homes during an existant strike. The company, however, took affirmative action without consulting the union, and upon protest, the union
was told the matter was not a subject of collective bargaining. The
2
Board held this a refusal to bargain on the part of the employer. 1
22
Soon thereafter, in the Weherhaeuser Timber Co. case, the Board
clarified its interpretation of the terms "wages" and "conditions of
employment." The employer sought to raise meal prices in camp dining
rooms where a substantial number of employees ate one or more meals
per day. The distances to facilities in the nearest towns varied from
five to twenty miles. The Board language used here has characterized
later decisions concerning company housing.
The Board left no doubt that the term "conditions of employment" applies not only to conditions under which the employee is
forced to work, but also to non-compulsory aspects of the employeremployee relationship. The fact that the disputed condition might be
considered a convenience to the employee will not remove it from the
scope of the Act; nor is it relevant in this respect that it meet a personal
need. As to "wages," the scope of the term is not limited to remuneration received by employees for the actual performance of work or productive activity. It includes "emoluments resulting from employment
in addition to or supplementary to actual rates of pay." 23 The Board
in speaking of the availability of meals concludes that the "privilege
itself" constitutes an emolument of value and may properly be considered a part of the employees' "wages."
The Elgin Brick Company case 24 of 1950 afforded a second clear
holding by the Board that company housing must be considered a subject of mandatory collective bargaining. Here an employer refused
Inland Steel Co. v. N. L. R. B., 170 F. 2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948).
W. W. Cross and Company v. N. L. R. B., 174 F. 2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949).
Note, 58 YALE L. J. 803 (1948-49).
West Bolston Manufacturing Co. of Alabama, 87 N. L. R. B. 808 (1949).
"' See J. A. Bently Lumber Co., 83 N. L. R. B. 803 (1949) where employer
17

8

l
19
2

maintaining quarters for logging crews was found guilty of violating Section
8 (a) (3) of the Act, by attempting to evict employees during strike. Board
held occupancy of the houses to be a condition of employment.
22Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87 N. L. R. B. 672 (1949).
2
3Id. at 675.

"Elgin

Standard Brick Mfg. Co., 90 N. L. R. B. 1467 (1950).
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to bargain concerning oppressive lease provisions. The Board found
this to be an unfair labor practice in as much as the privileged quarters
constituted a part of the employees' wages and a condition of their
25

employment.
In the Hart Cotton Mills case, 2 6 of 1951, the Hart Cotton Mills,

Inc., of Tarboro, North Carolina, maintained company houses for the
exclusive use of its employees. The rental price was well below that
for similar houses in the immediate area, housing was difficult to locate
thereabouts, and it was admittedly necessary for the employer to furnish
cheap housing in order to secure and maintain a full working crew.
The employer was found guilty of an unfair labor practice as a result
of his refusal to bargain at any time concerning the sale or rental of
the company owned houses.2 7 Upon petition for enforcement of the
Board order, the Fourth Circuit reversed the Board on other grounds,
company housing here being only a small part of a complicated labor
problem. But in dealing with the housing phase of the problem presented, the court held that a refusal to bargain concerning company
housing was in this instance an unfair labor practice. It emphatically
stated that such houses are often a necessary part of the enterprise,
and are maintained by the employer and rented at such rates as to
represent a substantial part of the employees' wages. In conclusion it
asserted the subject "to be one in which the employees have so great
an interest in connection with their work that it should be a subject
'2 8
of collective bargaining."
In 1953 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals once again considered
the bargainability of company housing. The Le High Portland Cement
case 29 involved an employer who maintained company houses for the
exclusive use of his employees in an area where other housing was
rarely available. The rent was below prevailing rates in the area, and
had not been changed since the year 1937. On refusal of the employer
to submit proposed rent increases to collective bargaining, the Board
found an unfair labor practice, 30 and the court sustained its ruling. In
clarification of its former decision, the court held it unnecessary that
company houses be an "essential part of the enterprise or that their
occupancy affect the workers pay." It determined a case to be suf2"See W. T. Carter and Bro., 190 N. L. R. B. 2020 (1950), and Indianapolis
Wire Bound Box Co., 89 N. L. R. B. 617 (1950), where Board held eviction
from company houses to be in violation of Section 8 (a) (3), after it had determined occupancy of such houses to be a "term and condition of employment."
" N. L. R. B. v. Hart Cotton Mills, Inc., 190 F. 2d 964 (4th Cir. 1951).
",
Hart Cotton Mills, Inc., 91 N. L. R. B. 728 (1950).
2' Id. at 972.
"'N.L. R. B. v. Le High Portland Cement Co., 205 F. 2d 821 (4th Cir.
1953).
" Le High Portland Cement Co., 101 N. L. R. B. 1010 (1952).
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ficiently established by a showing that ownership and management of
the houses materially affected the conditions of employment. Low rent
plus living near the plant, concluded the court, gave occupants substantial advantages which affected their wages and conditions of employment.
These views were in harmony with those of the Board in the Bemis
Brothers Bag Company case81 of 1951 where refusal to bargain concerning rent increases for company houses was held to be a violation
of Section 8 (a) (5). The houses were maintained strictly for employees. A statement in the lease provided that the premises were a
part of the plant facilities of the lessor. Tenancy was on a week to
week basis, and rent, water and light bills were often, though not always
deducted from employees' pay checks. On termination of employment,
houses were to be vacated. Housing was available in a nearby town,
and public transportation afforded a speedy means of reaching the
plant. Rentals were approximately the same as in the town. There
was, however, a waiting list of eighty families seeking company homes.
On petition for enforcement of the Board order, however, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals in N. L. R. B. v. Bemis Brothers Bag Company,3 2 held company housing, under the stated circumstances, to be
outside the scope of mandatory collective bargaining. In reaching its
conclusion, the Court emphasized a Board finding that only thirty-five
percent of the employees in the bargaining unit were involved, and
found that the language of the Act "clearly contemplates matters and
things which arise out of, and may properly be considered a part of
the employment relation,--the business in which the employer and
employee participate as necessary and essential components in the furtherance of the enterprise. 833 The Court conceded, however, that if
rent prices were so low as to constitute the savings on rent a part of
the wage structure, or employees were forced by circumstance or by
the employer to reside in company-owned houses, they could properly
be held "wages" or "conditions of employment." It noted provisions
of the lease which restricted and controlled occupancy of the homes,
but concluded that lease provisions could not solely control the bargainability of company housing, otherwise they could be changed and
the source of power destroyed by its exercise. To support a previously
suggested criterion, the Court found company housing in this case to
relate only incidentally to the business and the employment and held
such a subject to concern only living conditions during off hours when
an employee is free to pursue his personal life as he may prefer.
81

Bemis Bros. Bag Co., 96 N. L. R. B. 728 (1951).

" N. L. R. B. v. Bemis Bros. Bag Co., 206 F. 2d 33 (5th Cir. 1953).
33 Id. at 37.

19541

NOTES AND COMMENT

Standards of living conditions, concluded the Court, affect a person's
job efficiency, but do not make living expenses and means of residence
conditions of employment. A contrary holding would mean all employees, whether in company houses or not would be able to bargain for
living quarters.
Notwithstanding the factual differences between the Bemis Bag case
and those that have gone before, it is submitted that the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals reached the wrong decision. As to the fact that only
thirty-five percent of the employees were involved, the court failed
to realize that the duty to bargain collectively is for the protection of
minority groups as well as the majority and that smallness of number
affected is not a factor.3 4 Nor does the fact that housing was available
in a nearby town at rents comparable to those in the mill village justify
the holding that the latter were not bargainable. The issue was a rent
increase, amounting in effect to a wage cut for the tenants of company
houses. Living in the town meant transportation costs. Eighty applicants stood ready to fill the next vacancy in a 300 unit mill village.
In the light of the advantages to the employer, of company housing,3 5
it does not seem improper to conclude that company houses are "necessary and essential components in the furtherance of the enterprise," as
distinguished from a wholly personal, off-hour facility.
LACY

H.

THORNBURG

Pleading and Procedure-Counterclaims Exceeding the Jurisdictional
Limit of the Court-Remedies
A potentially troublesome problem is illustrated by the following
hypothetical case: Automobiles belonging respectively to A and B are
involved in a collision. The automobile of A sustains damage in the
amount of $50.00 and the automobile of B in the amount of $500.00.
Before B can institute suit in the superior court to recover his damages, A sues B before a Justice of the Peace to recover damages in
the amount of $50.00.1
Does B have to seek recovery of damages sustained by his automobile by entering a counterclaim2 to A's cause of action at the risk of
"Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87 N. L. R. B. 672 (1949) ; Steele v. Louisville
and Nashville Railroad Co., 323 U. S. 192 (1944).

" Notes 4 and 5 supra.

'Justices of the Peace have concurrent jurisdiction with the superior court
of civil actions in tort when the amount in controversy does not exceed fifty
dollars. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 7-122 (1953).
2 Counterclaim is used herein to mean a claim of the defendant in which an
affirmative judgment against the plaintiff is prayed for. Generally the scope of
this comment is limited to those counterclaims that exceed the plaintiff's claim.
For distinctions and definitions in the area of counterclaims, recoupments and
set-offs see: MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL
CASES

§ 463 (1929).
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losing his right to recovery if he does not? If so is his claim limited
to $50.00? If he does not counterclaim will the decision of the Justice
bar his subsequent independent action even if it is not adverse to him
or inconsistent with his claim? Can he bring an independent suit while
A's cause is still pending? If not, what if the statute of limitations
bars his claim? If he can bring an independent action while the first
action is still pending, what if the first action finally determines that his
negligence was the proximate cause of the collision? Does he have
to litigate two suits in different courts at the same time? Is there any
way that he can have the whole controversy litigated in one action
and not have to diminish his own demands for relief? Does the code
provide a clear and adequate procedure by which the whole controversy may be adequately determined when the first claim is filed in
a justice's court, and the defendant has a claim arising out of the same
transaction that exceeds the jurisdiction of that court?
No clear answer to the foregoing questions is found in the North
Carolina law. North Carolina General Statute, § 1-13 53 provides
that in the superior court the answer of the defendant must contain
a statement of any new matter constituting a defense or counterclaim.
G. S. § 1-1374 states that a counterclaim must be a cause of action
arising out of, or connected with the same contract or transaction5
forming the basis of plaintiff's claim. The courts have construed
these acts generally to allow a defendant to counterclaim or not at
his option. 6 Such construction is in accord with decisions of other
jurisdictions in which similar or identical code provisions have been
construed. 7 The "must" in § 1-135 does not mean that the defendant
3
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-135 (1953).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-137 (1935). "The counterclaim mentioned in this

article must be one existing in favor of a defendant and against a plaintiff between whom a several judgment might be had in the action, and arising out of
one of the following causes of action: (1). A cause of action arising out of the
contract or transaction set forth in the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or connected with the subject of the action. (2). In an action arising
on contract, any cause of action arising also on contract, and existing at the
commencement of the action." It is necessary to note that the second part of
this statute was not referred to in the discussion as it is not applicable to collisiontype counterclaims.
SAdverse claims arising out of the same collision clearly arise out of the
same transaction. McLean Trucking Co. v. Carolina Scenic Stages, 95 F. Supp.
437 (M. D. N. C. 1951) ; Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690, 28 P. 2d 916 (1934);
Allen v. Salley, 179 N. C. 147, 101 S. E. 545 (1919).
0 Union Trust Co. v. McKinne, 179 N. C. 328, 102 S.E. 385 (1920)
(distinguishes Allen v. Salley, 179 N. C. 147, 101 S.E. 545 [1919]). Francis v. Edwards,
77 N. C. 271 (1877). See also Brandis, A Plea for Adoption by North Carolina
of the Federal JoinderRules, 25 N. C. L. REv. 245 (1947).
Note, 8 A. L. R. 694 (1920). There are many states with counterclaim provisions similar to those of North Carolina (see notes 3 and 4, supra) and also
a few with provisions identical to North Carolina's. Cf. N. D. Rxv. CODE § 280710 and § 28-0714 (1943) ; S. C. CODE § 10-652 and § 10-703 (1942) ; WASH.
REV. CODE § 4.32.080 and § 4.32.100 (1951).
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must plead his available counterclaim, but rather, if he does choose
to plead his available counterclaim he inust plead it in his answer.
Similarly, the rules of procedure of the Justice's courts state that a
counterclaim may be interposed.8 While the rules of procedure for
the Justice's courts are separate from those of the superior court they
must borrow from G. S. § 1-137 for effect and meaning.9 In Allen vu.
Salley,'0 and subsequent decisions," our court said that the claims of
both plaintiff and defendant in an automobile collision are a single
cause of action and must be settled in one action. There can be but
one judgment for the defendant or for the plaintiff. In such a situation,
12
the defendant is bound to counterclaim or his claim will be barred.
14
13
Although the rule as to collisions, and several other situations,
may not be consistent with the general rule it has been restated by
cases 15 and recognized by commentators' 6 so often that it cannot be
disregarded.
The weight of authority is to the effect that absent an express rule
or statute there cannot be a compulsory counterclaim.' 7 There may
be a bar to the defendant's claim, however, based on the ground that
the decision in the initial suit is inconsistent with the claims in the
second suit.1s Under the federal practice the defendant must counterclaim any cause which at the time of the service of the pleading, he
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 7-149 rule 3 (1953).

' No definition of counterclaim is contained in N. C. GEN. STAT. § 7-149 rule 3
(1953) nor is there a definition within the rules of practice for justice's courts.
1" Allen v. Salley, 179 N. C. 147, 101 S.E. 545 (1919).
" Dwiggins v. Parkway Bus Co., Inc., 230 N. C. 234, 52 S.E. 2d 892 (1949);
Johnson v. Smith, 215 N. C. 322, 1 S.E. 2d 834 (1939).
12 Allen v. Salley, 179 N. C. 147, 101 S.E. 545 (1919).
13 See, Brandis, A Plea for Adoption by North Carolina of the Federal Joinder
Rules, 25 N. C. L. REv. 245 (1947).
1, See note 6 supra.
"'McLean Trucking Co. v. Carolina Scenic Stages, 95 F. Supp. 437
(M. D. N. C. 1951); Dwiggins v. Parkway Bus Co., Inc., 230 N. C. 234, 52
S.E. 2d 892 (1949); Johnson v. Smith, 215 N. C. 322, 1 S.E. 2d 834 (1949);
Allen v. Salley, 179 N. C. 147, 101 S.E. 545 (1919).
10 Note, 22 A. L. R. 2d 621 (1952).
Brandis, A Plea for Adoption by North
Carolina of the Federal Joinder Rules, 25 N. C. L. REv. 245 (1947). Note, 33
H~Av. L. REv. 857 (1920).
17

Note, 8 A. L. R. 694 (1920).

and illustration 1 (1942).

RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS

§ 58 comment b

For the result under an express compulsory counterclaim rule or statute compare RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 58 comment f (Supp.
1948), and Note 22 A. L. R. 2d 621 (1952).
" RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 58 comment d and illustration 9 (1942).
2
FREMAN, JUDGMENTS § 787 at page 1670 (5th ed. 1925). "The test of one's right
to recover in a second action, after having waived his cross-claim in the first,
is, Can all the facts necessary to support the judgment rendered against him exist
at the same time with the facts necessary to support the cross-claim sought to
be enforced in the second suit? For if, in order to recover in the first action,
the plaintiff must have shown the falsity of the allegations made by defendant
in the second suit, then the former judgment is a bar." This is on the theory
that a final judgment cannot be collaterally attacked. (The above, of course,
assumes no compulsory counterclaim situation.)
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has against the opposing party if it arises out of the same transaction
or occurrence. 19 Admittedly the Federal Rules apply only to the federal
district courts,20 which can render verdicts unlimited in amount. Nevertheless, it is, in a sense, a court of limited jurisdiction in that there is
a minimum amount required before jurisdiction attaches. 21 This limita-

tion does not apply to compulsory counterclaims, for they are treated
as ancillary to the plaintiff's claim and if the court has jurisdiction of
the plaintiff's claim it derives jurisdiction of the compulsory counterclaim. 22 It is interesting to note, however, that no state follows the
logic of the district courts by giving unlimited jurisdiction of counterclaims to Justices. 2 3 In North Carolina the limited jurisdiction is not
relaxed on appeal to the superior court,24 for on appeal, even though
the trial is de novo, 25 the jurisdiction is derivative and if the justice
did not have jurisdiction over the counterclaim neither does the superior
court. 26 Nor, in the superior court, can a remittitur of a counterclaim
in excess of the jurisdictional limit of the justice be effected 27 or a new
counterclaim in excess of the justice's jurisdictional amount be inter28
posed.
Several of the states have statutes or rules based on Federal Rule
13 (a) or of similar effect. 30 Generally these states have some clear
" FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (a).

20 See, FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
Generally, see: 28 U. S. C. A. § 1331 and § 1332 (1950).
"2Jurisdiction over a compulsory counterclaim is regarded as ancillary to the
plaintiff's claim. 3 Mooan, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 13.15 (1948). But see, 3 Mooa,
FEDEAnL PRACTICE f[ 13.19 (1948) (permissive counterclaims generally need independent jurisdictional amount).
2"24 R. C. L., Set-Off and Counterclaim, § 6 (1919) ; Duresen v. Blackman,
117 Minn. 206, 135 N.W. 530 (1912); Note, 37 L. R A. (N. S.) 606 (1912).
See also: Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Burger, 181 N. C. 241, 247, 107 S.E.
14, 17 (1921).
"It has been held with us in a number of instances that any
counterclaim, coming within the purview of the statute, regardless of its amount,
may be set up in a justice's court for the purpose of set-off and recoupment as
a bar or defense to the plaintiff's cause of action. But, of course, an affirmative
judgment could not be entered in this court unless it fell within the jurisdiction
of a justice of the peace."
"'If the justice did not have jurisdiction, then the superior court will have
none on appeal since the jurisdiction is derivative. Stacey Cheese Co. v. Pipkin,

2

155 N. C. 394, 71 S.E. 442 (1911).

McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES § 703 (4) p. 817 (1929). Note, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.)
606, 616 (1911).
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-299 (1953).
See note 20 mipra.
2 Perry v. Pulley, 206 N. C. 701, 175 S.E. 89 (1934).
" Perry v. Pulley, 206 N. C. 701, 175 S.E. 89 (1934).
2 Meneely v. Craven, 86 N. C. 364 (1882) (defendant not permitted to extend
amount demanded beyond the jurisdiction of the justice's court by amendment
in the superior court).
29
ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 21-437 (Supp. 1951) ; COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 2 rule 13 (a)

(Supp. 1952); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 52.11 (1) (1941); IowA CODE R. Civ. P.
rule 29 (1950); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 509.420 (Vernon 1949); N. M. STAT. ANN.
§ 19-101 (13) (a) (Supp. 1951); TEX. STAT., R. Civ. P. rule 97 (a) (Supp.
1948)
; UTAHI CODE ANN., R. Crv. P. rule 13 (a)
20

(1953).

Anx. STAT. ANN. § 27-1121 (4) (1947) ; CAL. CODE Civ. PRoC. § 439 (194'9);
IDAHo CODE ANN. § 5-614 (1947); NEV. ComP. LAWs § 8604 (1929). With the
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and definite provision for the problem posed in our hypothetical. There
are three approaches to the general problem: (1) The defendant does
not have to plead his counterclaim before the justice for the provisions
apply only to a court of unlimited original jurisdiction ;31 (2) The defendant does not have to plead his counterclaim if it exceeds the jurisdictional limit of the court ;32 or (3) The defendant must plead his
counterclaim, but he does not have to plead it in the justice's court
if he shows it will exceed in amount the court's jurisdiction. 3 3 Upon
tender of the counterclaim or certification that it will exceed the court's
jurisdiction as to amount the case is removed to a court of original
jurisdiction, unlimited as to amount, where it is tried as if it had
originated there. It does not appear that North Carolina has any such
clear-cut remedy. We do not seem to be in the first category because
our courts have not construed the requirement of counterclaiming as
a mandate of General Statute § 1-135, 3 or otherwise applicable only
to superior courts.3 5 Perhaps North Carolina is in the second category
since the justice does not have jurisdiction of a counterclaim in excess
of his jurisdictional limit.36 There is no statute to reply upon, however, and no decision directly in point. Likewise we have no statute
to put us clearly in the third category.
exception of Arkansas the above code sections are merely additions to sections
similar to the North Carolina provisions as to counterclaims, notes 3 and 4
supra. The California provision is typical: "If the defendant omits to set up
a counterclaim upon a cause arising out of the transaction set forth in the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, neither he nor his assignee can
afterwards maintain an action against the plaintiff therefor."
The scope of this note does not include rules or statutes of very limited application. For instance: N. H. REV. LAws c. 391 § 14 and § 15 (1942) ; N. J. REv.
STAT. § 2:26-191 (1937); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4977 and § 4978 (1949).
Similarly, MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 93-3408 (1947), which appears at first blush to
be like the California code, is not included for the counterclaim to which it refers
must be one that tends to diminish or defeat the plaintiff's claim (and is technically only a set-off). See note 2 supra.
"RAiz.
CODE ANN. § 21-201 (1939); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 26-401 (1947) (but
see, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-102 (1947)); NEV. Comp. LAWS § 8573 (1929);
N. M. STAT. ANN. 19-101 (1) (1941).
32 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 396 (1949);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 517.240 (Vernon
1949) ; TEx. STAT. R. Civ. P. rule 97 (a) (1948).
11 COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 2 rule 13 (1) (1935) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 52.12 (1951);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1409 (1947) ; IOWA CODE ANN., R. Crv. P. rule 355 (1950);
UTAH CODE ANN., R. Civ. P. rule 13 (k) (1953).
2"It is essential to note that the North Carolina cases, as Allen v. Salley, 179
N. C. 147, 101 S.E. 545 (1919), do not construe the counterclaim statutes as
expressly requiring the defendant in an auto collision suit to counterclaim. The
rule, not being limited to the statute, is apparently not limited in application to
the superior courts. By way of comparison, Arkansas which has a counterclaim
statute which would not appear on its face to demand a counterclaim has construed the statute (applicable to their "superior court") to be a compulsory
counterclaim statute. In the cases so holding there is a great deal of reliance
placed on the legislative history of the act. Shrieves v. Yarborough, 220 Ark.
256, 247 S.W. 2d 193 (1952); Adams v. Henderson, 197 Ark. 907, 125 S.W. 2d
472 (1939); Morgan v. Rankin. 197 Ark. 119, 122 S.W. 2d 555 (1938) (all
three of these cases are auto collision suits.)
" See notes 15 and 16 supra.
" See notes 23 and 24 supra.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

Our Supreme Court will probably formulate a procedure applicable
to our hypothetical if it faces such a situation. If our court holds
that a defendant does not lose his right to sue on his claim by failure
to assert it in the first action, will the statutory defense of pendency
of a prior action between the same parties for the same cause be available to the plaintiff of the first action to dismiss the defendant's suit ?3
Such is the rule of Allen v. Salley,3 8 although in that case there was
no complication of the first court's not having jurisdiction to determine
the full amount of the defendant's claim. If the rule of Allen v. Salley
applies, then the defendant would have to await final adjudication of
the first suit before he could bring his action.39 If there were a judgment adverse to him, and also inconsistent with his claim then he would
be barred from bringing his claim by ordinary principles of res judicata.40 If there were not a judgment adverse to him he could bring
his independent action if the statute of limitations did not bar it. 41 Conversely, if the rule of Allen v. Salley was not applicable, the defendant
would have to litigate two actions, for if the first determined were adverse to him he would be barred in the second. 42 Of course, there
37N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-127 (3) (1953)
(grounds for demurrer) or N. C.

GEN. STAT. § 1-133 (1953) (provisions of § 1-127 available by answer when they
do not appear on the face of the complaint).
"Allen v. Salley, 179 N. C. 147, 101 S.E. 545 (1919). See also note 11 supra.
" See Note, 33 H~Av. L. REv. 857 (1920). It appears that generally the
second action is not dismissed because of pendency of a prior action between the
same parties for the same cause unless there is a compulsory counterclaim requirement. When the defendant has the option to counterclaim or not as he sees
fit, the fact that the parties are reversed in the second action is sufficient to disallow a dismissal. Conley v. Marshall, 304 Ky. 745, 202 S.W. 2d 382 (1947)
(collision: second action not dismissed) ; State ex rel. McHenry v. Cahoun,
87 Ohio App. 1, 93 N.E. 2d 317 (1950) (collision: second action in justice's
court not dismissable) ; Republic Automobile Ins. Co. v. Maedel, 253 Mich. 663,
235 N. W. 819 (1931) (collision: second action not dismissed). See notes 29
and 30 supra.
18RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 58 comment c and illustration 5 (1942). 2
FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 787 at page 1670 (5th ed. 1925).
Once the fact that
one party was guilty of negligence which was the proximate cause of the accident
has been finally adjudicated by a competent court it seems clear that the matter
cannot be collaterally attacked by contentions in another action concerning the
same transaction and between the same parties. Compare, RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 71 comment d (1942).
However, in RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 71
reviser's notes in comment d (Supp. 1948) this was formally retracted: "the
suggestion of the comment was that a court (of jurisdiction limited in amount)
does not have jurisdiction to consider a claim for a greater amount and, therefore, its adjudication of such a claim when set up by way of defense to a claim
within its jurisdiction should not be conclusive in a subsequent action between
the parties involving the larger claim. It appears that the great weight of
authority ... is to the contrary effect."
' See note 17 supra.
22 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 719 (5th ed. 1925). "Where two actions involving
the same issue or issues, between the same parties or their privies, are pending
at the same time, so that a final judgment in one would be res judicata or a bar
in the other, -when the judgment in one becomes final it may be urged in the
other by appropriate proceedings, regardless of which action was begun first.
It is the first final judgment, although it may be in the second suit, that renders
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might be a consolidation at the superior court level, but if in the second
action the question of whether the rule of Allen v. Salley applied were
appealed, before an adjudication of the merits, 43 the defendant would
find it difficult to restrain the first action until the second could be
decided on that point and remanded.
Perhaps our court might say, notwithstanding the fact that there
is no statute to such effect, that if the whole cause cannot be adequately
determined in the justice's court it is mandatory for the justice to remove it, and that the action should be removed to the superior court
where it should be tried as if it originated there.44 That seems the
only really satisfactory course to take unless the action in the justice's
court could be enjoined, by application to the superior court, in order
to have the whole controversy determined in one action. 45
Of the possible courses which could be allowed the defendant in
our hypothetical, it seems that the inadequacy of most of them and the
uncertainty of all of them demand a statute to prescribe an adequate
procedure for determining the whole controversy in one action. The
following statute is proposed as a much-needed addition to our code:
General Statute § 1-137 (a). Counterclaims Exceeding the
Juristiction of Courts of Jurisdiction Limited in Amount
-When a counterclaim arising out of the same contract or transaction forming the basis of plaintiff's claim40 is tendered, before
evidence is introduced, in a court of jurisdiction limited in
amount, and because of such limitation, the court does not have
the matter res judicata in the other suit . . . So where, pending an action for
damages begun by one party to a collision, against the other, the latter sues
the former in another court for damages arising from the same collision, and
obtains a judgment, while this judgment may not be pleaded in bar of the first
action, it may be urged as res judicata as to the issues adjudicated, such as the
negligence of one party and the other's freedom from negligence." See note 40
.mpra.
It appears from the
'' Allen v. Salley, 179 N. C. 147, 101 S.E. 545 (1919).
report of the case that the point went up on appeal to the supreme court before
there was an adjudication on the merits even though the decision of the superior
court was against dismissing the second action. Certainly if the trial court ruled
in favor of dismissing the second action there would be difficulty in restraining the
first action until the point could be determined and remanded. Also, of course,
there could be no consolidation unless the first and second actions were both in
the same county.
" Compare notes 23, 24, 26, 27, and 28 supra.
" Note, 125 A. L. R. 337 (1940). Otis v. Graham Paper Co., 188 Ga. 778,
4 S.E. 2d 824 (1939) (collision: permissive counterclaims: first action in a court
of jurisdiction limited in amount enjoined).
,.It is noted that the intent of the proposed statute is to allow removal of
counterclaims "arising out of the contract or transaction," which exceed the jurisdiction of the court, pleaded by the defendant. The reasons that "claims required to be pleaded in the first action" is not suggested as the criterion for
removal are: (1) The practical impossibility of foreseeing all situations to
which the court may apply the mandatory counterclaim rule; and (2) The
difficulties inherent in administering a rule so closely drawn.
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jurisdiction, the entire action shall be removed to the superior
court of the same county upon the filing by the counterclaiming
defendant of such bond as would be required for appeal to the
superior court if there were a verdict adverse to him for the full
amount of the claim by the plaintiff. The removal is mandatory
upon the filing of the bond and the superior court is to have
complete power to render any adequate verdict and judgment,.
regardless of amount.47
DANIEL

L.

BELL, JR.

Real Property-Easements-Implication from Description in Deed
The owner of a tract of land fronting on a city street conveyed out
of the tract two lots bordering on the street. One deed called for a
10-foot alley as the eastern boundary of the lot conveyed; the other
called for the alley as the western boundary. The owner later conveyed
a third lot in the rear, the deed to which described it as fronting on a
10-foot alley running from the street and between the two lots previously
conveyed. The plaintiffs, owners of the western front lot and rear
lot, brought an action to determine whether they have an easement in
the alley, since quitclaimed to defendants by heirs of the original
grantor. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that bare references
to the alley for descriptive purposes, being the only evidence of an
intent of the grantor to establish the easement, were insufficient standing
alone to create an easement by implication or otherwise.1
""The proposed statute treats the plaintiff as if he had obtained a favorable
judgment in the justice's court, and does not deprive him of any rights he has
under the present law. The only change is that a counterclaiming defendant
is now entitled to plead his claim in full provided he follows a defined procedure.
Neither does the statute deprive the justice's courts of jurisdiction in any
case. The effect of "exclusive original jurisdiction" in contract actions, where
the amount of the plaintiff's demand is less than $200.00, N. C. GEN. STAT. § 7-22
(1953), is unchanged: no superior court can acquire jurisdiction, except on appeal or removal from a justice. See also N. C. GEN. STAT. § 7-21 (1953) (concurrent jurisdiction with the superior court in other actions where amount claimed
is less than $50). See N. C. CoNsr. Art. IV, § 27 (as changed 1875) : "The
several Justices of the Peace shall have jurisdiction, under such regulations as
the General Assembly shall prescribe, of civil actions, founded on contract, wherein the sum demanded shall not exceed two hundred dollars (The Constitutional
Convention of 1875 changed "exclusive original jurisdiction" to "jurisdiction.")

... And the General Assembly may give to the justice of the Peace jurisdiction
of other civil actions wherein the value of the property in controversy does not
exceed fifty dollars . . . The party against whom the judgment is given may
appeal to the superior court from the same."
The reference to
1 Green v. Barbee, 238 N. C. 77, 76 S.E. 2d 307 (1953).
the alley in the deed to the plaintiffs' front lot was: "Beginning at a 10-foot
alley on . . . comer . . . thence in an east direction 105 feet to a stake on a 10foot alley to the beginning. . . ." The reference in the defendants' deed was:

" .west

210 feet to an alley; thence with the east side of said alley north

210 feet to
supra.

. . .

line...

"

Transcript of Record, pp. 17-18, Green v. Barbee,
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The court determined: (1) that the alley was not a way of necessity to either of the front lots at the time they were originally conveyed,
since they fronted on a street; (2) that there was no allegation that
the alleyway was the only means of access to the rear lot when it was
originally conveyed; and (3) that there was no allegation that, at the
time of the original conveyance, "the use of the alley had been so long
continued and so obvious or manifest as to show that it was meant
to be permanent; or that the easement was necessary to the beneficial
enjoyment of the lot conveyed, . . . as being essential to the creation

12
of an easement upon the severance of an estate."
Facts similar to those in the principal case arose in Milliken v.
Denny," a prior North Carolina case, in which it was held that the
mere description of land in a deed as bounded by an alley was not
sufficient to create an easement in such alley. The court there ruled
that the language in the deed did not estop the grantor from closing
the alley, and that the testimony at the trial left nothing to guide them
as to the grantor's intention save the deed itself, thus inferring that
the grantor's intention would control if it could be determined. It was
also noted that there was no evidence that the alley affected the value
of the property, or that there was any declaration of easement by the
grantors. In Harrisv. Carter,4 where plaintiff's land had been bounded
on a public road which was later discontinued, the defendants were
held to be equitably estopped from obstructing the road, but the court
relied on the fact that buildings were erected, business was being conducted, and that the value of the lot would be seriously impaired by an
obstruction of the road.
Jurisdictions other than North Carolina generally hold that where
land is conveyed by deed describing it as bounded by a street or way,
an easement in the street or way passes to the grantee by implication
of law.5 The easement so created is usually based on the theory that

2 Green v. Barbee, 238 N. C. 77, 81, 76 S.E. 2d 307, 310 (1953).
'141 N. C. 224, 225, 53 S.E. 867, 868 (1906), the court stated: "...
the
mere fact that the deed . . . called for 'a stone,' thence north 84 degrees and 22
minutes west 340 feet along the south side of the ten-foot alley, was not per se
sufficient to impose an easement upon the ten feet of land referred to as an alley,
which passed to the owners of the lot conveyed."
'189 N. C. 295, 127 S.E. 1 (1925).
' Malone v. Jones, 211 Ala. 461, 100 So. 831 (1924); Crute v. Hyatt, 220
Ark. 537, 249 S.W. 2d 116 (1952); Petitpierre v. Maguire, 155 Cal. 242, 100
Pac. 690 (1909) ; Hamil v. Pone, 160 Ga. 774, 129 S.E. 94 (1925) ; Iseringhausen
v. Larcade, 147 La. 515, 85 So. 224 (1920); Teal v. Jagielo, 327 Mass. 156, 97
N.E. 2d 421 (1951); Casella v. Sneirson, 325 Mass. 85, 89 N.E. 2d 8 (1949) ;
Haab v. Moorman, 332 Mich. 126, 50 N.W. 2d 856 (1952); Carlin v. Paul, 11
Mo. 32 (1847); McPherson v. Monegan, 120 Mont. 454, 187 P. 2d 542 (1947);
Lindsay v. Jones, 21 Nev. 72, 25 Pac. 297 (1890); Hughes v. Lippincott, 56
N. M. 473, 245 P. 2d 390 (1952); In re Thirty-First (Patterson) Ave., 152
Misc. 849, 273 N. Y. Supp. 757 (Sup. Ct. 1934) ; Walters v. Smith, 186 Va. 159,
41 S.E. 2d 617 (1947). For a collection of cases, see 2 THOMPsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 479 n. 25 (Perm. Ed. 1939).
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having so described the land as bounded by a way, the grantor and
those claiming under him are estopped to deny the existence of such a
way or the grantee's rights therein. 6 Some courts hold the easement
passes by implied grant, without relying on estoppel, 7 and the rationale
of estoppel has been criticized as improperly applied to create this
type of easement.8 It has been stated however, that it is immaterial
whether the easement operates "as an implied grant, covenant, warranty, or estoppel"; the question is whether the way was intended by
the grantor as a boundary of the land conveyed. 9
Where the street or way is not designated as a boundary but is
referred to only for the purpose of description, the general rule does
not apply, and no easement will be found, 10 as where the way is only
coincident with the line described, the reference to the way having been
made for the purpose of description "as any other mark or monument
might have been referred to."'" Nor does the rule apply where the
description is false, 12 where the grantor does not own the fee in the
8

See note 5 supra.

'E.g., Tursi v. Parry, 135 Pa. Super. 285, 5 A. 2d 399 (1939), where the
court also recognized authority holding that there was an implied covenant that

a way existed as described in the conveyance and would be continued for the
use of the grantee and those claiming under him.
Some of the cases mention both estoppel and an implied covenant as the basis
for the rule: E.g., Petitpierre v. Maguire, 155 Cal. 242, 100 Pac. 690 (1909);
Casella v. Sneirson, 325 Mass. 85, 89 N.E. 2d 8 (1949). See 3 TIFFANY, RnAL
PROPERTY § 799, p. 307 (3rd ed., Jones, 1939), where it is said: "The statement . . that the reference to a street involves an 'implied covenant' on the part
of the grantor that there is such a street, appears ordinarily to mean merely that
he is precluded from denying the existence of the street."

' See discussion in 3

POWELL, REAL PROPERTY

§ 409, p. 412 (1952), where it

is stated: "The fact remains, that the easement exists because of the combined
effect of a pegphrase in the conveyance and of the circumstances of the conveyance. It is, therefore, understandable that some courts speak of such an
easement as arising from 'implication.' It is neither accurate nor useful to
speak of these easements as created by 'dedication' or by 'estoppel.'"
'Lankin v. Terwilliger, 22 Ore. 97, 100, 29 Pac. 268, 269 (1892), where the
court says that the easement "rests upon the fact that the grantor, by describing
the land as bounded by a way . . . intends thereby to confer upon the grantee,
as appurtenant to the granted premises, the right to use such way. . ..
The easement so sought is to be distinguished from easements arising by
implication of law as ways of necessity. Casella v. Sneirson, 325 Mass. 85, 89
N.E. 2d 8 (1949). It is also to be distinguished from easements arising where
there is an existing use at the time of severance of the estate. Hughes v. Lippincott, 56 N. M. 473, 245 P. 2d 390 (1952).
10 Bates v. Johnson, 217 Ky. 673, 290 S.W. 474 (1927) ; Lankin v. Terwilliger,
22 Ore. 97, 29 Pac. 268 (1892); see Malone v. Jones, 211 Ala. 461, 100 So.
831 (1924) ; Talbert v. Mason, 136 Iowa 373, 113 N.W. 918 (1907).
" Lankin v. Terwilliger, 22 Ore. 97, 102, 29 Pac. 268, 270 (1892). The deed
described the land by metes and bounds: ". .. commencing at a point on the
west side of the country road at the . . . corner of . . . the 'Old Cemetary,' . . .
thence with the meander of said road. . . ." See Talbert v. Mason, 136 Iowa
373, 113 N.W. 918 (1907); cf. Bates v. Johnson, 217 Ky. 673, 290 S.W. 474
(1927) (To a point "near" a road and running "just below" a road, held a
reference for the purpose of description).
1 Teasley v. Stanton, 136 Ala. 641, 33 So. 823 (1903).
The description by
courses and distances showed the lot was 105 feet distant from the "reserve"
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way, 13 or where there are "peculiar facts and circumstances" ;14 but
the fact that the land was bounded by the "side" of a road is not such
an exception, and an easement will be found. 15
The principal case16 would thus seem to indicate that North Carolina is contra the general rule, and does not recognize an easement
where land is described in the deed as being bounded by a way. The
court holds in effect that the intention of the grantor was to mention
the alley only for descriptive purposes. And though a reference only
for descriptive purposes is an exception to the rule,17 the court speaks
of the deed as calling for an alley as a boundary of the lot conveyed,
and this type of description falls within the general rule. In the opinion
of the court in the Green case18 neither the general rule nor the principle
of estoppel were referred to, although the court did recognize that there
was authority elsewhere running contrary to their holding.
The principal case, as well as Milliken v. Denny,19 indicates that
the reference to an alley in a deed, bounding the lot conveyed by the
alley, will not suffice to create an easement by implication, nor will it
estop the grantor and those claiming under him from closing the alley,
but that there must be something in addition, showing an intention on
the part of the grantor to create an easement. 20 That the court would
apply estoppel even if it were shown that the grantee bought the land
on the representation that there was a right of way, and that the value
of the land was affected by the alley as an easement, seems doubtful
where the facts are such as are involved in the principal case, since
the defendants there ostensibly had no notice of any representation
on which it was fronted in the deed. No implied covenant arose, the description
being false.
See Talbert v. Mason, 136 Iowa 373, 113 N.W. 918 (1907).
4
, 37
I1n re Opening One Hundred and Sixteenth Street, 1 App. Div. 436, N. Y. Supp. 508, 516 (1st Dep't 1896), where the "conveyance of a comparatively
small triangular piece of land did not grant as an appurtenance to it the beneficial use of a piece of property many times its size and value, and all for the
consideration of one dollar."
" Casella v. Sneirson, 325 Mass. 85, 89 N.E. 2d 8 (1949). It was held that
such a description was just as effective to pass an easement as one bounding
the land "by or on" a way although the rule had been held not to apply in an
earlier Massachusetts case, McKenzie v. Gleason, 184 Mass. 452, 69 N.E. 1076
(1904), where the land was bounded by the "side" of a road.
(1953).
18 Green v. Barbee, 238 N. C. 77, 76 S.E. 2d 307
',

See note 10 mpra.

",Green v. Barbee, 238 N. C. 77, 76 S.E. 2d 307 (1953).
10 141 N. C. 224, 53 S.E. 867 (1906).

"0In North Carolina, when the grantor sells lots with reference to a plat or
map on which there are streets and alleys laid out, he and those claiming under
him are held to be estopped to deny the existence of an easement in the alley and
the right of the grantee to use it. Broocks v. Muirhead, 223 N. C. 227, 25 S.E.
2d 889 (1943). See Note, 31 N. C. L. RLv. 202 (1953).
See 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 409 (1952), where easements created by the
general rule and those passing by reference to a plat or map are discussed jointly
and correlated to the same principle.
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In view of these decisions, reliance

should not be placed on a description in a deed of a way as a boundary,
and perhaps the advice given in Milliken v. Denny should be followed:
"If purchasers wish to acquire a right of way or other easement over
other lands of their grantor, it is very easy to have it so declared in
the deed of conveyance." 21
CALVIN C. WALLACE

State Torts Claims Act-Right of Subrogation'
Does the right of subrogation exist under the provisions of the
"Tort Claims against State Departments and Agencies Act" ?2 This
question was recently answered affirmatively by the North Carolina
2 141 N. C. 224, 231, 53 S.E. 867, 870 (1906).
1The purpose of this note is not a detailed discussion of either subrogation or
Tort Claims Acts but is merely to bring an important decision interpreting the
Tort Claims Act of North Carolina to the attention of legal profession.
For a discussion of the Federal Tort Claims Act see, Baer, Suing Uncle Sam
in Tort, 26 N. C. L. REv. 119 (1948) ; Fisher, The Federal Tort Clains Act after
Five Years, 3 MEacER L. REv. 263 (1952) ; Hiley, A Review of the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 14 GA. B. J. 301 (1952) ; Jackson, The Tort Clains Act-The Federal Government Assumes Liability in Tort, 27 Nim. L. Rnv. 30 (1947) ; Woolston,
Federal Tort Claims Act Digest, 28 DICTA 143 (1951); Note, 4 Wyo. L. 3. 96
(1949) ; Comments, 42 ILL. L. Rnv. 344 (1947), 56 YALE L. J. 534 (1947).
For a comparison of the Federal Act and the English Act see Street, Tort
Liability of the State: The Federal Tort Claims Act and The Crown; Proceedings Act, 47- MIcH. L. Rxv. 341 (1949).
See generally for discussions of tort liability of various states, Oberst, The
Board of Claims Act of 1950, 39 Ky. L. J. 35 (1950) (Kentucky) ; Troxell,
Tort Responsibility of the District of Columbia, 19 B. A. D. C. 504 (1952) (District of Columbia); Note, 8 MONT. L. REv. 45 and 97 (1947) (Montana); Comments, 23 IND. L. Rry. 468 (1948) (Indiana), 47 N. W. U. L. Rv. 914 (1953)
(Illinois), 90 OHIO St. L. J. 501 (1948) (Ohio), 23 So CALIF. L. REv. 507 (1950)
(California), 27 TEx. L. REv. 337 (1949) (Texas).
Also see Borchard, Tort Claims agabist Government: Municipal, State and
Federal Liability, 3 A. B. A. J. 221 (1947); Smith, Municipal Tort Liability,
48 MICH. L. Rtv. 41 (1949).
In regard to subrogation generally, see, Gleason and Intrater, A New Trend
it Subrogation, 38 Gao. L. J. 646 (1950) ; Mullen, The Equitable Doctrine of
Slebrogation, 3 MD. L. Ray. 201 (1939). Also, see generally, 50 Al. Jun. Subrogation §§ 1-147 (1944).
' N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-291 to 143-300 (1952). The pertinent section, N. C.
GEIN. STAT. § 143-291 (1952), reads in material part as follows: "The State
Industrial Commission is hereby constituted a court for the purpose of hearing
and passing upon tort claims against the State Board of Education, the State
Highway and Public Works Commission, and all other departments, institutions,
and agencies of the State. The Industrial Commission shall determine whether
or not each individual claim arose as a result of a negligent act of a State employee while acting within the scope of his employment and without contributory
negligence on the part of the claimant or the person in whose behalf the claim is
asserted. If the Commission finds that there was such negligence on the part of
a State employee while acting within the scope of his employment proximately
causing the injury and no contributory negligence on the part of the claimant
or person in whose behalf the claim is asserted, the Commission shall determine
the amount of damages the claimant is entitled to be paid, including medical and

other expenses ....

but damage awarded shall not exceed $8,000."

For a summary of the North Carolina Act see, A Survey of Statutory Changes
hi North Carolina in 1951, 29 N. C. L. Ray. 351, 416 (1951).
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Supreme Court in Lyon & Sons, Inc. v. N. C. State Board of Education and/or Sampson County Board of Education.3 In deciding this
case of first impression, 4 the Court turned to the decisions of the federal
and state courts on the question.
This same question, with reference to Section 931 of the Federal
Tort Claims Act,5 caused much conflict in decisions of the lower federal
courts. In some instances, the subrogee's cause of action was dismissed
on the ground that the Act being in derogation of sovereign immunity
and thus to be strictly construed could not, in the absence of express
authorization, be interpreted as including subrogees. 6 On the other
hand, motion to dismiss the subrogee was in most cases overruled on
the ground that even if statutes waiving immunity to suit must be
strictly construed, they must also be interpreted in the light of legislative intent and if the intention were to include subrogees, then in the
absence of express exemption they are included.7 Thus two time
-238 N. C. 24, 76 S.E. 2d 553 (1953).

'This was an action for damages to the plaintiff's automobile, resulting from
negligence of a state employee, wherein recovery was also sought upon the subrogated rights of the plaintiff's insurer, which had paid a portion of the damage.
60 STAT. 843 (1946), as amended, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110,
2401, 2412, 2671 to 2680 (Supp. 1950).
Most of the litigation concerned 28 U. S. C. § 931 (1946) of the old Judicial
Code, which under the revision of the Judicial Code (effective Sept. 1, 1948,
PuB. L. No. 773, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. [June 25, 1948]) is now divided and with
immaterial changes appears at 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 (b), 2674 (Supp. 1950).
28 U. S. C. § 931 (1946) provided in pertinent part that: ". . . the United
States District Court for the district wherein the plaintiff is resident or wherein
the act or omission complained of occurred . . . sitting without a jury, shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to hear, determine, and render judgment on any claim
against the United States for money only ... on account of damage to or loss
of property or on account of personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission or any employee of the Government while acting within
the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant for such damage,
loss, injury, or death in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred. Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the United States
shall be liable in respect to such claims to the same claimants, in the same manner, and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. .. "
'Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 333, 335 (E.D.
N. Y. 1948) ("What counts is a specific grant by Congress to a specific person
of the right to bring a specific form of action against the United States, which
were it not for that statute would be barred."); Cascade County, Montana v.
United States, 75 F. Supp. 850, 852 (D. Mont. 1948) ("Sovereignty . . . raises
a presumption against suability, unless it is clearly shown; . . . courts should
not enlarge the liability conferred beyond what the language requires") ; accord, Bewick v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 730 (N. D. Tex 1947); Old Colony
Ins. Co. v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 723 (S.D. Ohio 1947) ; Rusconi v. United
States. 74 F. Supp. 669 (S.D. Cal. 1947) ; ef. Gray v. United States, 77 F. Supp.
869 (D. Mass. 1948) (subrogee's cause of action dismissed on grounds he was
not "real party in interest").
"South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 594
(E. D. S. C. 1948) ; Town of Amherst v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 80 (W. D.
N. Y. 1948) ; Ins. Co. of North America v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 951, 952
(E. D. Va. 1948) ("Well established and readily admitted is the rule that statutes
waiving the immunity . . . must be strictly construed. But just as impelling is
the duty of the court to follow the intent of the Congress to make the United
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honored canons of construction met head-on. 8
The conflict in the district courts as to the interpretation of the
Federal Tort Claims Act as applied to subrogated claims was clarified
somewhat in the Courts of Appeals. In ten cases decided on appeal in
eight circuits the subrogee's right to sue in his own name was sustained
in eight decisions,) and in only one was the subrogee's cause of action
denied altogether. That decision was later re-argued and modified to
States fully liable. . . ."); Niagara Fire Ins. Co. and Commissioners of State
Ins. Fund v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 850 (S. D. N. Y. 1948) ; Forrester v.
United States, 75 F. Supp. 272 (E. D. Wis. 1947); Wojciuk v. United States,
74 F. Supp. 914, 916 (E. D. Wis. 1947) ("It would be a strained and unwarranted
interpretation of the intention of Congress to say it planned to give the district
courts jurisdiction of cases brought by claimants originally suffering loss, but
to reserve to itself the consideration of the claims of those standing in the shoes
of the original claimants by operation of law.") ; Hill v. United States, 74 F.
Supp. 129 (N. D. Texas 1947) ; accord, Grace to use of Grangers Mut. Ins. Co.
v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 174 (D. Md. 1948) (held that derivative claims as
such are not allowed but the damaged party could join the subrogee as an
equitable party who would be entitled to some part or the whole of the recovery).
'Wojciuk v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 914, 916 (E. D. Wis. 1947) (Congress took great care in designating twelve different categories of claims which
the Tort Claims Act was not intended to cover and none of the twelve categories
includes subrogees; therefore the doctrine of expressio imius est exclusio alterius
may be invoked). Bid see Cascade County, Montana v. United States, 75 F.
Supp. 850, 853 (D. Mont. 1948). The doctrine of statutory construction, expressio unius est exchsio alterius is well recognized. See, e.g., Rybbott v. Jarrett, 112 F. 2d 642, 645 (4th Cir. 1940). See also 50 Am. JuR., Statutes § 434
(1944) and cases there cited. For a discussion of strict construction of statutes
waiving sovereign immunity see, 49 AM. JuR., States, Territories, and Dependencies, § 97 (1943).
' State Farm Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. United States, 172 F. 2d 737 (1st
Cir. 1949), reversing Gray v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 869 (D. Mass. 1948);
South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. United States, 171 F. 2d 893 (4th Cir.
1948), affirming South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. United States, 78 F.
Supp. 594 (E. D. S. C. 1948); Yorkshire Ins. Co. v. United States and Home
Ins. Co. v. United States, 171 F. 2d 374 (3rd Cir. 1948), reversing Yorkshire Ins.
Co. v. United States and Home Ins. Co. v. United States, Civil No. 10417 and
10418, D. N. J., Nov. 13, 1947, cert. granted 336 U. S. 960 (1949) ; United States
v. Chicago, R. I. & P- Ry., 171 F. 2d 377 (10th Cir. 1948); National American
Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 171 F. 2d 206 (9th Cir. 1948), reversing National
American Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, Civil No. 872, S. D. Cal., Nov. 21,
1947; Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, 170 F. 2d 469 (2d Cir.
1948), reversing Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 333
(E. D. N. Y. 1948), cert. granted, 336 U. S. 960 (1949); Old Colony Ins. Co.
v. United States, 168 F. 2d 931 (6th Cir. 1948), reversing Old Colony Ins. Co. v.
United States, 74 F. Supp. 723 (S. D. Ohio 1947); Employer's Fire Ins. Co, v.
United States, 167 F. 2d 655 (9th Cir. 1948) (subrogee's motion to intervene
granted), reversing Rusconi v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 669 (S. D. Cal. 1947).
Holding in Old Colony Ins. Co. v. United States, 168 F. 2d 931 (6th Cir.
1948) that Congress intended that subrogees should be included in the Act, the
court said: "If Congress had intended to exclude subrogees from the benefits
of the Act, it could have readily included them in the list of twelve specific
exemptions." 168 F. 2d at 933. See 28 U. S. C. § 2680 (Supp. 1950) for the
claims expressly excluded from the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Congress has demonstrated that it can find the recauisite language to bar a
subrogee's suit. See Foreign Claims Act, 55 STAT. 880 (1943), as amended 31
U. S. C. § 224(d) (1946) (". . . to consider . . . and make payments . . .
of claims, including claims of insured but excluding claims of subrogees...
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allow the subrogee to join as an equitable party or sue in the name of
the subrogor.10
The Government in contesting the validity of derivative claims by
subrogees under the Tort Claims Act contended that considerations
other than the language of the Act itself barred action by subrogees,
arguing that subrogation constituted "assignment" within the meaning
The "Anti-Assignment" Act,
of the Assignment of Claims Act."
however, as the Assignment of Claims Act is commonly called, has
long been held to apply only to voluntary assignments,' 2 while subrogation is essentially assignment by operation of law. Thus it was held
that subrogated claims would not be barred by the "Anti-Assignment"
3
Act.'
As decisions were handed down by the lower federal courts the
numerical majority allowed suit by the subrogee' 4 until the United
States Supreme Court finally laid the question to rest in 1949 by holding in United States v. Aetna Casualty,& Surety Co.' 5 that the subrogee could sue and recover in his own name. In that case the "AntiAssignment" Act was not asserted by the Government as a complete
bar to the derivative claim of the subrogee, but only to require that
suit be brought in the name of the insured for the use of insurer to
protect the procedural rights of the United States.' 6 That argument
1

United States v. Hill, 171 F. 2d 404 (5th Cir. 1948), reversing Hill v.

United States, 74 F. Supp. 129 (N. D. Tex. 1947), re-argued and modified 174
F. 2d 61 (5th Cir. 1949).

The "Anti-Assignment" Act, which is discussed

infra, was on re-argument held to bar recovery by the subrogee in his own

name.
11
REv.

§ 3447 (1853), 31 U. S. C. § 203 (1946), as amended, 61
STAT.
The Act, commonly
STAT. 501, 508 (1947), 31 U. S. C. § 203 (Supp. 1950).
called the "Anti-Assignment" Act, prohibits the assignment of claims against
the United States.
12 See note 17 infra.
18 State Farm Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. United States, 172 F 2d 737 (1st Cir.
1949); South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. United States, 171 F. 2d 893
(4th Cir. 1948) ; North American Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 171 F. 2d 206
9th Cir. (1948) (assignment surplusage since claim arose by operation of law) ;
Wojciuk v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 914 (E. D. Wis. 1947) (subrogation differs from assignment or transfer since it is an act of law, and a creature of
equity and justice); Ins. Co. of North America v. United States, 76 F. Supp.
951 (E. D. Va. 1948) ; Forrester v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 272 (E. D. Wis.
1947). Contra: Cascade County, Montana v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 850
(D. Mont. 1948) ; Bewick v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 730 (N. D. Tex. 1947).
See Annotation, 12 A. L. R. 2d 460 (1950) for examples of transfers barred by
the "Anti-Assignment" Act.
notes 6, 7, 9, and 10 supra.
1See
15338 U. S. 366 (1949).
0
Id. at 371. It was stated that the purpose of invoking the "Anti-Assignment" Act was two-fold: (1) to avoid involving the United States in litigation
as to the existence or extent of subrogation; and (2) to insure that suits would
be brought in the names of the original claimants so that the United States could
avail itself of its statutory rights in respect of venue, and of counter-claim and
offset on account of any cross-claims it might have against the original claimants.
It was further contended that the congressional intent was that the "Anti-Assignment" Act should apply.
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was rejected by the Court and the "Anti-Assignment" Act held inapplicable.' 7 In commenting on the doctrine of strict construction of
statutes waiving sovereign immunity, the Court felt that the congressional attitude in passing the Tort Claims Act was reflected by Justice
Cordozo when he said in speaking of a waiver of immunity statute
of New York: "The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves
hardship enough where consent has been withheld. We are not to add
to its rigor by refinement of construction where consent has been announced." 18
Few state decisions have dealt with the question raised in the principal case. 19 In a suit by a subrogated claimant under a South Carglina statute2° in 1930, the court held that statutes waiving sovereign
immunity must be strictly construed and in the absence of express provision for subrogated claims they must fail. 21 Cothran, J. concurred
in the result of the decision in that the claim should fail because of
failure to file a claim within the time specified by the statute22 but dis1United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U. S. 366, 372, 374, 376
(1949). The Court held that even the limited application of the "Anti-Assignment" Act contended for was untenable because of the uniform interpretation
for the past 75 years that assignments by operation of law are not within the
prohibition of the Act [See, e.g., Western Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 268
U. S.271, 275 (1925) ; National Bank of Commerce v. Downie, 218 U. S.345, 356
(1910) ; Price v. Forrest, 173 U. S.410, 421 (1899) ; Goodman v. Niblack, 102
U. S. 556, 560 (1880)], and because of many affirmative indications of Congressional intent that subrogated claims should not be excluded from suit in the
name of the subrogee under the Tort Claims Act. These indicia included the
allowance of subrogated claims under the old Small Claims Act, 42 STAT. 1066,
31 U. S. C. § 215 (1922), which was repealed by the present Tort Claims Act
[See, e.g., 21 Comp. GEN. 341 (1941); 36 Ors. Ary. GEN. 553 (1932); H. R.
Rep. No. 5065, 72 Cong., 1st Sess (1932)], and the explicit exclusion of subrogees from the Foreign Claims Act, 55 STAT. 880 (1942), as amended, 57 STAT.
66 (1943), 31 U. S. C. § 224 (d) (1946).
The Court also pointed out the correct application of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to subrogation under the Tort Claims Act. This aspect of the
problem is beyond the purview of this note. For discussions of the problem
before the decision in the Aetna Casualty case, see Notes, 28 NEB. L. REy. 430
(1949),
58 YALE L. J. 1395 (1949).
"8 Anderson v. John L. Haynes Construction Co., 243 N. Y. 140, 147, 153 N.E.
28, 29 (1926).
"Lyon & Sons, Inc. v. N. C. State Board of Education and/or Sampson
County Board of Education, 238 N. C. 24, 76 S.E. 2d 553 (1953).
20Act of March 10, 1928, 35 STAT. L. p. 2055, now codified as S. C. CODE
§ 5887 (1) (1942), which provides in part: "Any person, firm or corporation
who may suffer injury to his or her person or damage to his, her, or its property
by reason of a defect in any State Highway, or by reason of the negligent operation of any vehicle or motor vehicle in charge of the State Highway Department . . . may bring suit against the State Highway Department. . . ." The
act also provided that in order to have a cause of action a claim must be filed
with the State Highway Department within ninety days after the alleged injury
or damage.
"1United States Casualty Co. v. State Highway Dept., 155 S.C. 77, 151 S.E.
887 (1930).
22 "If the claim of the insurance company to subrogation could be sustained,
it could only be to the cause of action which the owner of the car may have had
against the department, and, the complaint containing no allegation that a claim
was filed within the time required, it is lacking in an essential element of a cause
of action under the Act." Id. at 87, 151 S.E. at 891.
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sented in that it would be an illogical conclusion to construe the statute
so as to exclude all subrogated claims.2 -3 This South Carolina decision
was quoted and followed by the Kansas Supreme Court 24 and then the
South Carolina and Kansas decisions were followed by the Supreme
Court of Alabama. 25
In 1950 the question of the validity of subrogated claims again
came before the South Carolina Supreme Court in the Jeff Hunt
Machinery case,26 wherein the court in substance reversed its position
by holding that a plaintiff could bring an action notwithstanding the
fact that he had been reimbursed for his loss by an insurer and was
bringing the action for the insurer's benefit. The court pointed out
that it had uniformly held that statutes waiving the State's immunity
from suit, being in derogation of sovereign immunity, must be strictly
construed, and that the state could be sued only in the manner and
upon the terms and conditions prescribed by statute. However, it
added that statutes of that kind are not to be construed to such an
extent as to defeat the legislative intent, as the rule of strict construction is subject to the principle that all rules of statutory interpretation
are merely for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the legisla27
ture as expressed in the statute.
23Justice

Cothran felt that the fundamental error of the majority was the

conclusion that the Act created a liability.

In his opinion it merely provided

a remedy where none existed before, thereby raising the controlling issue of

whether the owner of a fixed claim and a fixed remedy under the Act had the
right to assign his claim to his insurer. Under ordinary circumstances the right
would not be questioned. Thus, Justice Cothran thought that to say, under a

rule of strict construction, that because the act does not give the assignee of a
claim the right to sue, he does not come within its protection, would be an exceedingly narrow and unjustified contradiction of the purpose of the act, which
evidently was that the department should be held responsible for the consequences
of its delicts. Aside from that, when a state vests one with a fixed right and
a fixed remedy, it follows necessarily that it intended to vest in him every incident
of those rights, one of which is the right to assign them. United States Casualty
Co. v. State Highway Department, 155 S. C. 88, 89, 151 S.E. 891 (1930) (dissenting
and concurring opinion).
2
American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. State Highway Commission, 146 Kan.
239, 69 P. 2d 1091 (1937).
" Turner v. Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 235 Ala. 632, 180 So. 300 (1938).
"Jeff Hunt Machinery Co. v. State Highway Dept.,.217 S. C. 423, 60 S.E.
2d 859 (1950). When it was contended that the question had been concluded by
United States Casualty Co. v. State Highway Dept., 155 S. C. 77, 151 S.E. 887
(1930), the Court admitted that that decision had been quoted and followed by
the Courts of Kansas (see note 24 supra) and Alabama (see note 25 supra) but
it also pointed out that a Texas court in Dickson v. State, 169 S.W. 2d 1005
(Tex. Civ. App. 1943) had doubted the soundness of the decision and had quoted
with approval from the dissenting opinion. The court thought that the United
States Casualty Case did not control the precise question as it was only authority
for the proposition that derivative claims as such are not authorized by the statute;
or in other words, that the proper plaintiff is the party actually damaged, but
there is nothing in the statute to preclude him from bringing the action solely
for the benefit of another who has paid his loss.
"'Jeff Hunt Machinery Co. v. State Highway Dept., 217 S. C. 423, 426, 60
S.E. 2d 859, 860 (1950).
Referring to the case at hand, the court said that to say the person sustaining
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It was in the light of these prior decisions in the state and federal
courts that the question of the right of subrogation under the North
Carolina Torts Claims Act was brought before the North Carolina
Court. In reaching a decision it was pointed out by the court that the
North Carolina statute28 is not a verbatim copy of the Federal Tort
Claims Act 29 nor of that of the State of South Carolina." ° However,
the Court felt the logic and reasoning of the federal courts, of Cothran,
J. in the first South Carolina decision, 3 ' and of the South Carolina Court
in its most recent decision,3 2 to be the better view and persuasive as
applied to the North Carolina Tort Claims Act.88
The court pointed out that subrogation is a remedy which is highly
favored and, being broad and expansive, has a liberal application.
Further, the court felt that if the defendants were private persons the
right of subrogation would clearly exist, and if the legislature in relieving itself of passing on claims had desired to exclude subrogation
it would have written that intention into the Act. Instead, the state
waived its immunity and in so doing occupies the same position as any
4
other litigant and is entitled to no special privileges.8
So reasoning, the court held that the plaintiff could maintain a
suit in its own name for the benefit of itself and its insurer, though
the insurer is a proper party, and could be made a party by the Industrial Commission or the court at its discretion8 5
In holding that the right of subrogation exists under the North
Carolina Tort Claims Act, it would appear that the North Carolina
Court has adopted the better view, aligned with the decision of the
Supreme Court in the Aetna Casualty case and the South Carolina
Supreme Court in the Jeff Hunt Machinery case. Only four state
courts have been called upon to decide the precise question, and now
stand two for and two against subrogation under Tort Claims Acts.
But it should be noted that the decisions of the two states denying
the right of subrogation are based on the decision in the first South
Carolina case, which has apparently been repudiated. How other jurisdamage
by his
foreign
reason.
28

may not bring an action
insurer would necessitate
to its spirit and purpose
Id. at 427. 60 S.E. 2d at
Note 2 supra.

because he has been compensated for the loss
writing into the statute an exception entirely
and thereby limit its meaning without sense or
860.

2'Note 5 supra.
"0Note 20 sup'ra.
1 United States Casualty Co. v. State Highway Dept., 155 S. C. 77, 87, 151
S.E.2 883, 891 (concurring and dissenting opinion). See note 23 supra.
Jeff Hunt Machinery Co. v. State Highway Dept., 217 S. C. 423, 60 S.E.
2d 859 (1950).
"Lyon & Sons, Inc. v. N. C. State Board of Education and/or Sampson
County Board of Education, 238 N. C. 24, 32, 76 S.E. 2d 553, 559 (1953).
2 Id. at 33, 76 S.E. 2d at 559.
25
Id. at 33, 76 S.E. 2d at 560.
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dictions will deal with the right of a subrogee to sue under Tort Claims
Acts remains to be seen as proper cases for determination arise, but
it would seem that the trend clearly points towards liberal construction
of such Acts and the allowance of suit either by the subrogor for the
use of the subrogee or by the subrogee in his own name.
Z. CREIGHTON BRINSON

Taxation-Income-Involuntary Change from Cash to Accrual Basis
of Accounting-Accounts Receivable and Inventory
Many small businessmen, unwary of tax pitfalls and without adequate accounting systems to record the operation of their businesses,
are jolted when the tax lightning strikes with a substantial deficiency
for a particular year due to the Commissioner's changing their method
of reporting income. In one of the typical situations, the partnership's
books were kept on the basis of cash receipts and cash disbursements.
Accounts receivable reflecting credit sales were not included in the
determination of income but inventories were used in determining the
cost of goods sold. The Tax Court approved the Commissioner's
determination that the partnership should report its net income on the
accrual basis and for the year of the change should add the amount of
accounts receivable at the beginning of the year to the proper amount
of income determined on the accrual basis.'
The Internal Revenue Code requires that net income be computed
on the basis of the taxpayer's annual accounting period in accordance
2
with the method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the books.
But if the method of keeping books does not clearly reflect the income,
the Commissioner is authorized to make a recomputation on such basis
as, in his opinion, will clearly reflect the income.3 Where inventories are
required, 4 as in the principal case, 5 the accrual method of accounting
must be used.6 However, the discretion given the Commissioner to
'David W. Hughes, P-H 1953 TC MEm. DEc. 1 53,285 (1953).
2 INT. REV. CoDE § 41, provides in part: "The net income shall be computed
upon the basis of the taxpayer's annual accounting period (fiscal year or calendar
year, as the case may be) in accordance with the method of accounting regularly
employed in keeping the books of such taxpayer; but if no such method of accounting has been so employed, or if the method employed does not clearly reflect the income, the, computation shall be made in accordance with such method
as in the opinion of the Commissioner does clearly reflect the income."
3Ibid.
'U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22 (c)-1 (1953), provides in part: "In order to
reflect the net income correctly, inventories at the beginning and end of each
taxable year are necessary in every case in which the production, puichase, or
sale of merchandise is an income-producing factor."
' Note 1 supra.

'U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.41-2 (1953),

provides in part:

"...

in any

case in which it is necessary to use an inventory, no method of accounting in
regard to purchases and sales will correctly reflect income except an accrual
method."
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decide which method is necessary to reflect clearly the taxpayer's net
income is not unlimited and will be reviewed when abuse is clearly
shown.

7

Under the cash system of reporting only receipts and disbursements
of cash or its equivalent are considered in determining income., Sales
on credit, giving rise to accounts receivable, are not reported as income
until payment is received. Therefore, when the Commissioner requires
the taxpayer to change to the accrual method, 9 the balance of accounts
receivable at the beginning of the year of change represents unreported
sales made in prior years. The collection of these accounts would be
excluded from income, since under the accrual method, sales are recognized as income in the year in which they are made. To avoid this
result the Commissioner has attempted to add the amount of accounts
receivable at the beginning of the year of change to the income computed on the accrual basis for the year as was done in the principal
case. The effect is to pyramid income into one year.10
There is a similar problem with regard to inventory at the beginning
of the year of change. This inventory represents purchases which
have been deducted as expenses in prior years whenever payment was
made for the merchandise. If the opening inventory is included in the
cost of goods sold, the taxpayer will receive the advantage of a double
deduction of this expense. Since under the accrual method the opening
inventory is used in determining the cost of goods sold (opening inventory + purchases - closing inventory = cost of goods sold) the
Commissioner has attempted to add the inventory value at the beginning
of the year to the income computed on the accrual basis. The effect
of this adjustment is to eliminate the use of the opening inventory in
determining the cost of goods sold, further bunching income into a
single year.'
The reception given by the courts to the Commissioner's attempt
to bunch income is reflected in decisions lacking in clarity and con'Brown v. Helvering, 291 U. S. 193, 203 (1934); Lucas v. American Code
Co., 280 U. S. 445, 449 (1930) ; Hardy v. Commissioner, 82 F. 2d 249, 250 (2nd
Cir. 1936).
'The receipts and disbursements may be actual or constructive. For a discussion of the cash method, see I MoNTGOMERY's FEDERA. TAXES, pp. 1116-1118,
(1952).
' The accrual basis ordinarily ignores the receipts and disbursements of cash
or its equivalent as the basis for determining income. Under the accrual system,
income -is
recognized whenever the right arises to receive cash or other property,
regardless of when collection or other receipt actually occurs. A deduction from
income is- generally recognized during the accounting period in which the liability
is incurred, regardless of when payment is made. For a discussion of the accrual
method, see I MoNTGOzEzRs FEDERAL TAXES, pp. 1118-1120 (1952).
"0For a brief discussion of the pyramiding aspects and other effects of a
change from an incorrect cash basis to a proper accrual basis see, Note, 37

A. 11
B. A. J. 694 (1951).
Ibid.
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sistency.' 2 The decisions upholding the Commissioner have been based
on the principle that it is within the Commissioner's discretion in changing the method of accounting to add income that would otherwise
escape taxation.' 3
Beginning with Commissioner v. Mnookin's Estate14 in 1950, the
courts began to distinguish between a change of accounting method and
a change of reporting method. 15 If the taxpayer properly kept his
books on the accrual basis but erroneously reported on the cash basis
the Commissioner could not pyramid income in the year of change. 16
2For a collection of cases and discussion, see Rabkin and Johnson, FEDERAL
INcomE, Gi=r AND ESTATE TAXATION, § 12.03 (3) (1953).
"aCarver v. Commissioner, 173 F. 2d 29 (6th Cir. 1949); Hardy v. Commissioner, 82 F. 2d 249 (2nd Cir. 1936) ; Michael Lovallo, P-H 1950 TC MEm. DEC.
50,184 (1950); Schuman Carriage Company v. Commissioner, 43 B. T. A. 880
(1941); Alameda Steam Laundry Association v. Commissioner, 4 B. T. A. 1080
(1926) ; Appeal of John G. Barbas, 1 B. T. A. 589 (1925).
(8th Cir. 1950). In this case the taxpayer kept his books
1" 184 F. 2d 89
on the accrual basis. However, in the tax returns the amount of uncollected credit
sales (accounts receivable) at the end of each taxable year were excluded from
income. The Commissioner changed the method of reporting and in the year
of change added the beginning balance of accounts receivable to the proper income computed on the accrual basis. The court, relying on Greene Motor Company v. Commissioner, 5 T. C. 314 (1945), held that the Commissioner had no
power to pyramid income in this situation and distinguished this case from Carver
v. Commissioner 173 F. 2d 29 (6th Cir. 1949), Hardy v. Commissioner, 82 F. 2d
249 (2nd Cir. 1936) and Schuman Carriage Company v. Commissioner, 43
B. T. A. 880 (1941) on the basis that here the books were kept on the proper
basis and no change in the method of accounting was required, there being
merely a change in the method of reporting.
The facts in Carver v. Commissioner, supra, were almost identical with the
facts in Commissioner v. Mnookin's Estate, supra, but an opposite result was
reached. In Carver the taxpayer changed his method of keeping books to the
accrual basis sixteen years prior to the year in which the Commissioner required the change in reporting while in Mnookin the taxpayer apparently had
always kept his books on the accrual basis. This difference does not appear to
be significant.
In Greene Motor Company v. Commissioner, supra, the taxpayer kept its
books and reported its income on the accrual basis. The taxpayer set up unwarranted reserve accounts and took some admittedly improper deductions as
additions to these reserves in 1938. The Commissioner sought to include the
amount of these reserves in the taxpayer's income for 1939. The Tax Court
held that there was no change in method of accounting involved and that the
Commissioner had no power to increase the income of one year by an amount
erroneously deducted in a prior year.
In Mnookin the error was in reporting sales on a cash basis while in Greene
Motor Company the error was merely in taking an improper deduction in the
prior year. Hence Mnookin appears distinguishable because there was a change
in accounting method as to sales while in Greene Motor Company there was only,
an attempt to include in income an improper deduction of the prior year.
"'For a full discussion of this development see Dixon, Pyrainiding Income In
Chann.afq From a Cash To an Accrual Method Of Accountijig, 8 TAx L. REv.
355 (1953).
196 F. 2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1952); Commissioner v.
1 Commissioner v. Cohn.
Schuyler, 196 F. 2d 85 (2nd Cir. 1952); Commissioner v. Frame, 195 F. 2d 166
(3rd Cir. 1952); Commissioner v. Mnookin's Estate, 184 F. 2d 89 (8th Cir.
1950): George V. Gilbert, P-H 1952 TC MEm. DEC. ff 52,183 (1952). In these
cases the books were kept on the accrual basis but in reporting income the unpaid
accounts receivable were omitted or the inventory was excluded so that as to these
items the cash basis was improperly used.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

However, if the taxpayer incorrectly kept his books on the cash basis
and reported income on the cash basis then the Commissioner's adjustments were proper. 17 This distinction was based on the fact that
Section 41 of the Internal Revenue Code refers to "the method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the books." Therefore, when
a change was required only in the method of reporting income, the
Commissioner did not have the discretionary power conferred by this
section to recompute the income and add the amounts of accounts receivable and inventory at the beginning of the year of change.
A further refinement of this distinction was made in later cases so
that taxpayers who kept books or records from which a computation
could be made of proper income on the accrual basis were not penalized
when the change to the accrual method was required.18 The theory
of these cases is that a change in keeping books is not required since
the proper income could be computed from the books and auxiliary
records. A change in reporting method was all that was required.
Even though income escapes taxation the principle invoked by the
cases prohibiting the bunching of income is that neither income nor
deductions may be taken out of the proper accounting period for the
benefit of the government or the taxpayer.' 9 Moreover, the discretion
which the Commissioner has under Section 41 of the Internal Revenue
Code to recompute income when it is not clearly reflected by the taxpayer's method of accounting does not give him authority to include
items of income attributable to earlier years or to disallow proper
deductions which were also (erroneously) taken in prior years. 20 This
would follow since the net income is to be computed on an annual
basis to reflect the net result of operations during a fixed accounting
21
period.
In Commissioner v. Dwyer,22 the taxpayer incorrectly kept his books
on the cash basis and reported income on the cash basis. The Tax
Court held that, since inventories were recorded and available, sufficient information was available to compute the income on the proper
" David W. Hughes, P-H 1953 TC MEm. DEC. It 53,285 (1953); Iley v.
Commissioner, 19 T.C. 631 (1952); Koby v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 1103 (1950),
appeal dismissed.
. Caldwell v. Commissioner, 202 F. 2d 112 (2d Cir. 1953)

(card file of

accounts receivable) ; Welp v. United States, 201 F. 2d 128 (8th Cir. 1953) (constructed inventory figures).
" Security Flour Mills v. Commissioner, 321 U. S. 281, 285, 287 (1944);
Commissioner v. Mnookin's Estate, 184 F. 2d 89, 92 (8th Cir. 1950); Ross v.
Commissioner, 169 F. 2d 483, 492 (1st Cir. 1948).
20 Welp

v. United States, 201 F. 2d 128, 133 (8th Cir. 1953) ; Commissioner

v. Mnookin's Estate, 184 F. 2d 89, 93 (8th Cir. 1950) ; Clifton Manufacturing Co.
v. Commissioner,
137 F. 2d 290, 293 (4th Cir. 1943).
2
Burnet v. Sanford and Brooks Company, 282 U. S. 359 (1931).
2203 F. 2d 522 (2nd Cir. 1953), affirming Cornelius J. Dwyer, P-H 1951
TC MEm. DEC. ff 51,206 (1951).
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basis and consequently the Commissioner was not justified in attempting to bunch income. This was dearly in accord with the distinction
developed in prior cases. However, the Eighth Circuit in affirming
3 on
went further and overruled the case of Hardy v. Commissioner,2
which the Commissioner had relied in all of the cases involving involuntary changes of methods of accounting, and based the decision on
the following principle:
Although there have been exceptions, it is established by the
great weight of authority that, if a taxpayer has not misrepresented or suppressed the facts, the statute of limitations not only
prevents any reassessment of the tax after the prescribed period
has passed; but that the Treasury may not assess a tax for a
later year to make up for a credit erroneously allowed, or a
24
charge erroneously omitted, in an earlier year.
The court recognized that distinctions had grown up concerning the
method of keeping books and the method of reporting but rejected
them as being without merit.
Clearly these refinements which have been made and to which the
court refers in Dwyer are without merit.25 For example, the innocent
who keep books and report on the cash basis would be penalized while
a taxpayer who keeps his books on the proper basis but who reports
on the cash basis would be rewarded with a windfall in the form of
tax-free income whenever the proper change is required. It appears
that both parties are equally at fault and that both should be treated
26
equally before the courts.
The confusion in this field may soon be eliminated by the decision
in the Dwyer case. The clear-cut rule would seem to be that the Commissioner may not pyramid income when an involuntary change of
3 82 F. 2d 249 (2nd Cir. 1936). In this case the taxpayer, a corporation,
which kept its books and reported income on the cash basis, requested the Commissioner to allow it to change to the proper accrual method in 1926. The Commissioner granted the request but required the taxpayer to make the change in
1925. The Commissioner added the accounts receivable and inventory at the beginning of 1925 to the income for that year. The court approved the Commissioner's
action in this language: "In putting the petitioner on the accrual basis in 1925,
the commissioner, bound to do it in a way that would clearly reflect its income,
was not required to adhere strictly to a stereotyped accrual form of accounting.
It is obvious that there must be some leeway in making the change from the
cash basis in order that the income for the first taxable period under the changed
method of reporting will be reflected accurately." 82 F. 2d at 251.
" Commissioner v. Dwyer, 203 F. 2d 522, 524 (1953).
" For a collection of cases and discussion, see Rabkin and Johnson, FEDERAL
INcomE, GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION, § 12.03 (3) (1953).
"In regard to a taxpayer who incorrectly reported interest on a cash basis,
one court said: "The failure of the petitioner to make its returns consistently
upon the accrual basis may place it in an unfortunate position. But for this
situation the petitioner is alone to blame." Schuman Carriage Company v. Commissioner, 43 B. T. A. 880, 889 (1941).
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accounting method is imposed. However, the decision in the Hitghe t27
case may be an indication that the Commissioner and the Tax Court
will continue to embrace the distinction in regard to methods of accounting and methods of reporting. Such a course would only prolong
the adjustment of an unsatisfactory situation.
On the premise that all taxpayers who are required to change from
the cash to the accrual basis should be treated alike, the next consideration is whether or not the result of the Dwyer decision is desirable in
our self-assessing tax system. It must be noted that when the taxpayer
requests permission to change from the cash to the accrual basis, the
taxpayer and Commissioner must agree to conditions under which the
change is to be made. 28 The implication is clear that the Commissioner
may not consent unless the omitted income is included and the duplicate
deductions are excluded. Therefore, it seems that after following
Dwywr to its logical conclusion there would still be a different result in
changing accounting methods depending on whether the Commissioner
or the taxpayer initiates the change. Again, there is no logical reason
for this difference. Why should the taxpayer who recognizes that he
is on the wrong reporting basis and who attempts to make the proper
change be penalized while the taxpayer who waits until he is forced
to make the change is rewarded?
It must be recognized that in changing from the cash to the accrual
basis of reporting there may be amounts which will be duplicated or
entirely omitted as a result of the change. A coherent tax policy would
require the taxing of this income in all cases regardless of who initiated
the change in accounting method. Perhaps the most equitable method
of adjustment would be to recompute income for the prior years in
which the sales arose and the inventory was paid for, even where the
statute of limitations would otherwise prevent any reassessment of
tax. An alternative would be to spread the additional income over a
reasonable number of tax years. Legislation has been proposed which
It seems clear that this inwould accomplish this uniform result.2
21
Note
28U. S.

1Treas.
supra.Reg. 118, § 39.41-2 (c) (1953), provides in part: "A taxpayer

who changes the method of accounting employed in keeping his books shall,
before computing his income upon such new method for purposes of taxation,
secure the consent of the Commissioner. . . . The application shall be accompanied
by a statement specifying the classes of items differently treated under the two
methods and specifying all amounts which would be duplicated or entirely
omitted as a result of the proposed change. Permission to change the method
of accounting will not be granted unless the taxpayer and the Commissioner
agree to the terms and conditions under which the change will be effected."
29 Cf., 66 H~Av. L. REv. 187, 188 (1952), where the author refers to a proposed statute (A. L. I. FED. INCOME TAx STAT. §§ X330, X332, Tent. Draft No 6,
1952) which would give the taxpayer the option of reconstructing previous
years' income or spreading the additional income over a three year period.
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come should not be pyramided into the year of change inasmuch as it
is income attributable to other accounting periods.
PAUL M. CARRUTHERS

Workmen's Compensation-"Accidental" Injury-an Anachronism
A 1953 Mississippi decision' has added one more drop to the ocean
of confusion concerning the legal meaning of the word "accident."
There a baker contracted a skin allergy from the use of a baker's pad
in handling hot pans of bread. After testimony by a dermatologist to
the effect that the employee was allergic to some material or chemical
in the pad, the attorney-referee awarded compensation on the basis of
"accidental" injury and the entire Commission affirmed.2 On appeal
the Mississippi Supreme Court refused to overturn the finding, agreeing that this was an "accidental" injury within the purview of the
Mississippi statute.8
To understand the decision, it is first necessary to briefly examine
the theory underlying Workmen's Compensation. In an economic
society containing as one of its basic essentials a large group of laborers,
it is desirable for the well being of all integrated society to protect
this group from industrial accidents which seem inevitable in the industrial machine. 4 To accomplish this end the economic burden is
placed upon industry rather than upon workers and their dependents,
who might otherwise well become wards of the State.5 And since this
benefit is directly for the laborer and only indirectly for the society,
Workmen's Compensation Acts should be construed liberally in favor
of the employee.6
'Hardin's Bakeries, Inc. v. Ranager, 64 So. 2d 705 (Miss. 1953).
'Under Mississippi procedure, hearings may be conducted by a Commissioner
or a representative of the Commission, who grants or denies compensation and
then' files his decision with the Commission. This decision is final unless within
twenty days a request or petition for review by the full Commission is made.
Appeal may be made from the Commission's finding within thirty days to the
Circuit Court of the county in -which the injury occurred, this appeal being
based only upon the record as made before the Commission. Finally, appeal may
be taken to the Supreme Court of Mississippi. Miss. LAWS 1948, c. 354, §§ 18,20.
'Miss. LAWS 1948, c. 354, as amended by Miss. LAWS 1950, c. 412.
'Bowen v. Hocldey, 71 F. 2d 781 (4th Cir. 1934).
'Tedars v. Savannah River Veneer Co., 202 S. C. 363, 25 S.E. 2d 235 (1943)
'Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of Wis. v. Konvicka, 197 F. 2d 691
(5th Cir. 1952); Beck v. National Sur. Corp., 171 F. 2d 862 (5th Cir. 1949);
Peterson v. Moran, 111 Cal. App. 2d 766, 245 P. 2d 540 (1952); Danziger v.
Industrial Accident Comm., 109 Cal. App. 71, 292 Pac. 525 (1930); Shockley v.
King, 31 Del. 606, 171 Atl. 280 (1922); Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. Pittman, 49
So. 2d 600 (Fla. 1950) ; Guevara v. Inland Steel Co., 120 Ind. App. 47, 88 N.E.
2d 398 (1949); Forcade v. List and Clark Const. Co., 172 Kan. 119, 238 P. 2d
549 (1951); Alexander v. Chrysler Motor Parts Corp., 167 Kan. 711, 207 P. 2d
1179 (1949); Jurich v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 233 Minn. 108, 46 N.W. 2d
237 (1951); Brookhaven Steam Laundry v. Watts, 214 Miss. 569, 55 So. 2d
381 (1951); McWilliams v. Southern Bleaching and Printing Works, 216 S. C.
121, 57 S.E. 2d 26 (1949); Thornton v. R. C. A. Service Co., 188 Tenn. 644,
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But even liberality must have its boundaries, if law is truly to produce justice. Thus, we find irritated Justinians admonishing: "(The
court) may not add to, nor detract from, the statute. The court must
take the statute as it is, not as it may think it should be."'7 Again: "We
cannot reconstruct the act, we can only interpret it." Or even further:
"The statute should be given a liberal interpretation, but liberality
should not be stretched into extravagance."
What then has been the occasion for this controversy? Basically
it would seem to be a conflict between a liberal construction in order
to effectuate the purpose of the Acts and common law notions of legal
liability. To go into all the possible ramifications of this conflict is
not the purpose here.10 Rather we seek to examine one of the most
controversial areas-what constitutes an "accident" as referred to in
the statutes and as related to the principal case.
Under most Workmen's Compensation Acts," not only must the
injury arise out of and in the course of the employment,1 2 but in the
majority of the Acts it must also be accidental. 18 Some courts have
interpreted "accident" as an unlooked for and untoward event, not
expected or designed ;14 it has been called a "fortuitous" event;15 or "a
quality or condition .. .of happening, coming by chance or without
design, or taking place unexpectedly or unintentionally";10 often, but
221 S.W. 2d 954 (1949); Industrial Accident Board v. Miears, 149 Tex. 270,
227 S.W. 2d 571 (1950); Jones v. California Packing Corp., 244 P. 2d 640 (Utah
1952).
Royal Indemnity Co. v. J.G. White Engineering Corp., 120 Misc. 332, 337,
198 N. Y. Supp. 264, 269 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
'Paterno's Case, 266 Mass. 323, 327, 165 N.E. 391, 392 (1929).
'In re Sickles, 171 App. Div. 108, 109, 156 N. Y. Supp. 864, 865 (3d Dep't.
1916). See also Matlock v. Industrial Commission, 70 Ariz. 25, 215 P 2d 612
(1950); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 69 Ariz. 280, 212
P. 2d 1001 (1950); Sanderson and Porter v. Crow, 214 Ark. 416, 216 S.W. 2d
796 (1949) ; In re Martinelli, 219 Mass. 58, 106 N.E. 557 (1914) ; Deemer Lumber
Co. v. Hamilton, 211 Miss. 673, 52 So. 2d 634 (1951); Simon v. Standard Oil
Co., 150 Neb. 799, 36 N.W. 2d 102 (1949); Henry v. A. C. Lawrence Leather
Co., 231 N. C. 477, 57 S.E. 2d 760 (1950); In re Trent's Claim, 68 Wyo. 146,
231 P. 2d 180 (1951).
"'For a comprehensive study of accidental injury, see 1 LARSON, WORKMAN'S
COMPENSATON LAW §§ 37.00-42.24 (1st ed. 1952).
"For a compilation of allWorkmen's Compensation statutes, see ScHNEIDER,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION STATUTES, 6 vols. (Perm. ed. 1939-1949).
1 LARSON, WoRXMEX's COMPENSATION LAW, § 6.10, pp. 41-43 (1st ed. 1952).
1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, §37.10, pp. 511-512 (1st ed.
1952).
1'New
Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Humphrey, 47 F. 2d 57 (5th Cir. 1931);
Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York v. Industrial Accident Comm. of Calif.,
177 Cal. 614, 171 Pac. 429 (1918); Jefferson Printing Co. v. Industrial Comm.,
312 Ill. 575, 144 N.E. 356 (1924); Woodruff v. Howes Const. Co., 228 N. Y.
276, 127 N.E. 270 (1920); Withers v. Black, 230 N. C. 428, 53 S.E. 2d 668
(1949).
"9 Benjamin F. Shaw Co. v. Musgrave, 189 Tenn. 1, 222 S.W. 2d 22 (1949);
Zappala v. Ind. Ins. Comm., 82 Wash. 314, 144 Pac. 54 (1914).
1" Gulf Oil Corp. v. Rouse, 202 Okla. 395, 397, 214 P. 2d 251, 253 (1949).
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not necessarily, accompanied by a manifestation of force-.1' Other
courts have added as a valuable ingredient a definite time, place, and
occasion.' 8 Or it may simply be interpreted as an "accident" in the
popular sense of the word. 19
How do these definitions apply to the principal case? Certainly
the allergy was unexpected, undesigned, untoward, unintentional, and
fortuitous. No definite time can be ascertained, but courts vary as to
what constitutes a definite time and place. Some say an accident does
not happen over an entire day, others hold that it may require six
months for an accident to culminate.2 0 "No stated period can be given
.. . as applied to each case, each must naturally depend on its own
' 21
circumstances."
But what of the requirement of the ordinary, popular sense of the
word? Justice Cardozo once dealt with the problem in Connally v.
Hunt Furniture Co., 22 where an embalmer's helper was infected by
poison entering an abrasion on his hand while working on a corpse.
In the majority opinion, affirming an award, Cardozo wrote:
"Germs may indeed be inhaled through the nose or mouth, or
absorbed into the system through normal channels of entry. In
such cases their inroads will seldom, if ever, be assignable to a
determinate or single act, identified in space or time. . . . For
this, as well as for the reason that the absorptionis incidental to
a bodily process both natural and normal, their action presents
itself to the mind as a disease, and not as an accident (italics
added). Our mental attitude is different when the channel of
' '23
infection is abnormal or traumatic, a lesion or cut.
Several early cases have also applied such a distinction. Thus
compensation was denied where infection followed from an employee's
dipping his hand into a staining solution, there being no evidence of
a scratch or abrasion ;24 where a plumber contracted an infection of the
eye from a particle falling into it, or by wiping his face with an infected
towel-again no prior abrasion ;25 where infection resulted from use
of a chemical solution in developing photographic plates ;20 and where
"'Winkelman
v. Boeing Airplane Co., 166 Kan. 503, 203 P. 2d 171 (1949).
"8 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 171 F. 2d 723 (5th Cir. 1948); Great
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Sexton, 242 Ky. 266, 46 S.W. 2d 87 (1932).
" Winkelman v. Boeing Airplane Co., 166 Kan. 503, 203 P. 2d 171 (1949).
" 4 SCHNEMER, WORKMEN'S COmPENSATION 387 (Perm. ed. 1945).
21 S. H. Kress and Co. v. Burkes, 153 Fla. 868, 870, 16 So. 2d 106, 107 (1944).
22240 N. Y. 83, 147 N.E. 366 (1925).
2' Connally v. Hunt Furniture Co., 240 N. Y. 83, 85, 147 N.E. 366, 367 (1925).
24 Jenner v. Imperial Furniture Co., 200 Mich. 265, 166 N.W. 943 (1918).
25 Voelz v. Industrial Comm., 161 Wis. 240, 152 N.W. 830 (1915).
-' Jeffreys v. Charles H. Sager Co., 233 N. Y. 535, 135 N.E. 907 (1922), affirming 198 App. Div. 446, 191 N. Y. Supp. 354 (3rd Dep't 1921).
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dermatitis resulted from washing out ink cans with a solution of caustic
27
soda.
Several later cases have turned on similar grounds. In 1936, the
Ohio Supreme Court refused compensation from irritations to an employee's face caused by peach stains in a towel on the basis of a lack
of causal relation, but by way of dictum stated that even were the
causal relation present, there was no accident, for the unusual or exceptional physical condition of the employee was not a legal trauma.28
A 1944 Florida decision refused compensation where a bakery employee
developed knots in her wrists from mixing dough, baking bread, and
scrubbing pans. The court based its finding on the lack of an unexpected, or unusual, sudden injury, as the Act required.29 In a 1952
Missouri case, an employee sustained injuries to his face, right side,
and ear by dust and dirty cotton lodgin to which he was exposed in
a cotton warehouse. In denying recovery, the court said there was no
80
impact, and that the exposure was usual.
However, Cardozo's distinction between the normal and the abnormal channels as a guide to the common meaning of "accident" has,
for the most part, given way to other legal interpretations, with the
real question centering around causal connection. Thus lung cancer
from inhaling dust,31 back injury where the strain was usual,3 2 cerebral
hemorrhage from excitement 3 or exertion,3 4 coronary thrombosis caused
by nervousness while driving at night in a dense fog,85 skin disease
from exposure to the sun,36 coughs spreading germs, 7 and sunstroke 8
7
Cheek
8

v. Harmsworth Brothers, 4 W. C. C. 3 (Eng. 1901).
Industrial Comm. of Ohio v. Zelmanovitz, 53 Ohio App. 92, 4 N.E. 2d
265 29(1936).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.02 (1952); S. H. Kress and Co. v. Burkes, 153
Fla. 868, 16 So. 2d 106 (1944). The Florida Court on the same grounds refused
compensation in Travelers Ins. Co. v. Shepard, 20 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1945) (dermatitis from packing oranges) ; City of Tallahassee v. Roberts, 21 So. 2d 712 (Fla.
1945) (injured vertebra). But see Meehan v. Crowder, 28 So. 2d 435, 437 (Fla.
1946), where compensation was granted for an injury over a three day period,
the court saying: "The event here is the sudden entry of the poisonous fumes into
Crowder's body."

"Rogers v. Sikeston Compress and Warehouse Co., 248 S.W. 2d 672 (Mo.
1952).
8" Scobey v. Southern Lumber Co., 218 Ark. 671, 238 S.W. 2d 640 (1951).
2 Nelson v. Ford Motor Co., 13 N. J. Super. 56, 80 A. 2d 235 (1951).
8
St. Dept. of Revenue v. Snelling, 84 Ga. App. 238, 65 S.E. 2d 822 (1951).
8
Bealer v. Town of Amherst, 278 App. Div. 993, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 772 (3d
Dep't 1951).
3 McNess v.Cincinnati St. Ry. Co., 90 Ohio App. 223, 101 N.E. 2d 1 (1951).
8'Pan American Airways v. Willard, 99 F. Supp. 257 (S.D. N. Y. 1951).
McRae v. Unemployment Compens. Comm., 217 N. C. 769, 9 S.E. 2d 595
(1940), commented on in 39 Micr. L. REv. 834 (1941). In view of this case it
would seem that the North Carolina Court takes a liberal view as to what constitutes an "accident" as applied to Workmen's Compensation, for the Court
there found a cough which spread disease germs to be an "accident." Whether
the same liberality would be evidenced on the facts of the principal case is open
to conjecture. But the step from a cough to wearing gloves is not a large one,
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are but a few of the recently classified "accidents," when all, or certainly most, would not be so classified in common parlance.
Thus, it is seen that in the application of the word "accident" there
has grown up in the courts a legal and judicial meaning far different
from the layman's definition and understanding, which the legislatures
probably intended in first using the term. The principal case is but one
more example of this. To the layman, the baker's injury would not
be an accident, nor would it be an occupational disease, as it is not
peculiar to bakers or to their working environment-it would simply
be what it was, a skin disease caused by the employment. For if this
were an accident, then almost any action, even a prolonged one, with
an unfortunate result could logically be deemed the same. However,
where there is a causal connection between the employment and the
injury, the legal trend is unmistakably toward such a result; to refuse
to recognize this or to advocate reversal is to play the role of the ostrich
and the sand.
The effect then is to render the word "accident" practically useless in
compensation cases, except as rationale to circumvent a statute saying
such is necessary. Courts responding to economic, political, and social
trends of the past thirty years have to that effect legislated. And though,
as Justice Cardozo wrote, there are "interstitial" areas where judicial
legislation becomes desirable,80 there is a constant danger of judicial
legislation being substituted for judicial interpretation.
In light of the aforementioned trend, the principal case reaches a
sound result. In actuality it carries rationalization one step further
to reach a desired result. It would be far more desirable if Workmen's
Compensation Acts did not include the element of accident (as some
do not),4 for it presents a roadblock to the sociological purpose of the
Acts, which is becoming less effective with more liberal interpretations,
but which, at the same time, has created an unhealthy trend toward
for allergy from pads is far less common and unexpected than disease spread
by coughs. For a compilation of North Carolina cases on accidental injury,
see N. C. W. C. A. ANx. § 97.2 (F) (1952).
" Commissioner of Tax and Finance v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 279
App. Div. 1124, 112 N. Y. S. 2d 527 (3d Dep't 1952).
CAnnozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDIc.AL PROCESS, pp. 98-141 (5th ed. 1925).
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.141 (1950); OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. § 1465-37
(1946); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 8306 (1925) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2494
(1949); Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. § 72-101 (1943). But even the courts of these
states have read "accident!' into the Acts. See Marlow v. Huron Mountain
Club, 271 Mich. 107, 260 N.W. 130 (1935); Malone v. Industrial Commission,
140 Ohio St. 292, 43 N.E. 2d 266 (1942); Middleton v. Texas Power and Light
Co., 108 Tex. 96, 185 S.W. 556 (1916); Martin v. St. Compensation Conmissioner, 107 W. Va. 583, 149 S.E. 824 (1929); In re Scrogham, 73 P. 2d 300
(Wyo. 1937). For a vigorous dissent to judicial inclusion of the word accident,
see Hagopian v. Highland Park, 313 Mich. 608, 22 N.W. 2d 116 (1920).
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legal rationalization 41 which may become infectious and spread to other
areas of the law.
PETER

G. KALOGRIDIS

' Some courts are more pointed: "It (the injury) cannot be attributed to the
occupation because it is not a disease which men in that occupation are subject
to contract; it is not a disease known to be incidental to that particular employment. Then it is the result of the accident or else we have a situation uender the
Workmen's Compensation Act where an employee contracts a disease out of
and in the course of his employment, and, yet not compensable (italics added).
Vogt v. Ford Motor Co., 138 S.W. 2d 684, 687 (Mo. App. 1940).

